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This paper studies worker displacement in the United States and the Nether-
lands. We discuss the relevant institutions, and we analyze the incidence and con-
sequences of displacement. In the 1993-1995 period, displacement rates in the US
and the Netherlands are about the same, and vary similarly with tenure and gen-
der. Also, we find some evidence that displacement hastens ret'uement in both
countries. Finally, in both countries, post-displacement wages ate higher than pre-
displacement wagea. In the Netherlanda, however, displaced workers may be more
likely to move into alternative joba directly, but, if they fail to do so, face longer
re-employment durations. This renders an isolated comparison of wage discounta
less informative.
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11 Introduction
This chapter studies worker displacement (i.e., permanent job separations initiated by em-
ployers because of adverse economic conditions). in the United States and the Netherlands.
Labor displacement has been widely studied in the US context, where adequate data has
been available for a considerably longer period than in most other countries. Conversely,
a similaz literature does not exist for the Netherlands, even though displacement is an
increasingly important phenomenon there.l This chapter discusses the relevant institu-
tions, and an empirical analysis of the incidence of displacement, and the labor market
transitions and earnings changes induced by displacement in both countries.
Our analyses of worker displacement will.usually identify displacement with perma-
nent (rather than tempotary) layoffs. In much of the analysis, we focus on workers with
substantial tenure or compare their experiences to those of dislocated persons with less
seniority. The restriction to pernannent layoffs is fairly irrelevant in the Netherlands since,
unlike the US, temporary layoffs with recall are rarely observed, and Dutch institutions
work against them. For instance, azrangements for Unemployment Insurance (UI) provi-
sion to unemployed who aze laid off temporarily are restricted to very specific activities.2
Therefore, discussion of the Netherlands uses tenure and cause of separation as defining
characteristics of displacement. By contrast, information on the cause ofjob terminations
is frequently available in US data sets and so is used to define displacements.
This chapter also provides new information on the relationship between displacement
and retirement (see Section 7). In the 1970s and the 1980s, Disability Insurance (DI) al-
legedly has been used as a convenient alternative to unemployment Insurance (UI) in case
of separation of workers in the Netherlands. Alternatively, early retirement arrangements
may have facilitated displacement of older workers. Although the data for the Nether-
lands provide some information on transitions from employment into these alternative
destinations, this information is not as rich as for other issues addressed below. The insti-
tutional arrangements concerning DI and early retirement are discussed in Subsection 2.2
and findings from existing empirical work clarifying the role of DI and early retirement
beyond the limited information offered by our analyses in Subsection 7.2. Surprisingly,
despite richer data, there has been little previous analysis of the relationship between
displacement and retirement in the United States. A preliminazy investigation of these
issues is provided in Subsection 7.1.
Given that there is an extensive previous North-American literature on displacement,
the discussion of displacement in the US frequently refers extensively to the results of ear-
lier research. The data used are aLso well known and designed for the study of displaced
1Diaplacement rates have increased fmm around 4 percent in 1970 up to 11 percent in 1993 according
to a rough estimate base on the UI inflow. Note that we also find that displacement rates are lower in
1994-1996 than in 1993. See Subsection 4.2 fot a discuasion of Dutch displacement rate time series.
2Temporary layoffa may occur in lesa organized ways. For instance se,asonally unemployed workers
can sometimea receive UI (see Subsection 2.2 for institutional details, and Subaection 4.2 for dixussion
of the consequences for our analysis. Emereon (1988) discues~ the role of temporary layoffs in varioua
industrialized countries.
2workers. As a result, this chapter provides a modest updating of prior analyses. By con-
trast, the Dutch analyses require data from vazious data source.s, not explicitly addressing
displacement, and represent the first substantive study of these issues. Discussion of the
Dutch data and results is therefore usually required to be more extensive than that for
the United States.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss institutions which
aze relevant to displacement, i.e. wage formation, employment protection, and social
security. Section 3 discusses the data sets. Time series and cross-sectional properties of
displacement rates aze discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses labor market transitions
following displacement. Analyses of wage and~or earnings changes induced by displace-
ment are presented in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss the role of early retirement and
DI. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional environment
2.1 United States
Compared to most other industrialized nations, US labor markets are highly flexible.3
Most obviously, few workers are unionized and minimum wages are low as a fraction of
average earnings. In 1996, union members accounted for only 14.5 percent of wage and
salazy employment and 10.0 percent of private wage and salary workers (US Bureau of
the Census, 1997: Table 688). Effective September 1, 1997, the minimum wage was raised
to ~5.15 per hour. However, even after this increase, it was only around 40 percent of the
average hourly earnings of production workers.4
Employees in most European nations have considerable protection against `unjust'
dismissals. By contrast, the `employment-at-will' doctrine provides US employera with
wide latitude to terminate workers for almost any reason. There are important excep-
tions for unionized workers and individuals with contracts containing provisions governing
discharges. Also, some state courts have recognized exceptions limiting dismissals when
employees perform acts serving the interests of public policy (e.g. jury duty) or when
an `implied contract' exists due to written or oral statements made by employers; and
some include `good faith' provisions requiring employers to treat workers in a`fair and
reasonable' manner in all employment relationships, including terminations.5 ALso, since
the Worker R,etraining and Notification Act (WARN) took effect in 1989, employers with
more than 100 full-time workers aze required to provide 60 days written advance notice
3See Siebert (1997) and Nickell (1997) for recent, and somewhat confiicting, diacussions of the role
of labor market rigidities in explaining the disparate employment experiences of the United States and
Europe.
4Production workers averaged 512.39 per hour in September 1997 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1997).
bMore detailed discuseion of these issues are provided in Krueger (1991) and Dertouaoe and Karoly
(1993).
3of plant closings or mass layoffs. However, the law contains numerous exemptions and a
preliminary analysis by Addison and Blackburn (1994) suggests that the legislation has
had little effect on the provision of notice.
Moreover, the US provides limited support to workers who lose jobs. By faz the
most important assistance comes from Unemployment Insurance (UI). The UI program is
overseen by the US Department of Labor but administered by the States, with the result
that there is variation in program eligibility and benefits across geographic locations.
Workers with qualified employment history are eligible for benefits if they are available
for work and have become unemployed due to involuntary separations from their jobs
(withóut good cause) or voluntary sepazations with good cause.s Benefit duration is
generally restricted to 26 weeks, although up to 13 additional weeks may be obtained
under the Extended Benefits Program, if the State unemployment rate is sufficiently
high.~ Almost all wage and salary workers are covered by the UI system but only a
small fraction of the unemployed actually receive benefits (36 percent in 1995).8 Wage
replacement rates are also relatively low, generally ranging between 50 to 70 percent of
the individual's average weekly pretax wage up to a State-determined maxitnum, and aze
taxable as normal income. Due to the ceiling, benefits aze somewhat progressive and
typically average between 30 and 40 percent of previous earnings.
Other programs more directly assist job losers. Trade Assistance Adjustment (TAA),
originally enacted in 1962, targets persons displaced from industries adversely affected by
import competition. Qualifying workers can receive up to 52 weeks of combined UI and
Trade R.eadjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits, 76 weeks if enrolled in an approved train-
ing program, with TRA generally paid at the same rate as UI. TRA is a limited program,
however - only 31 thousand workers were supported in 1994, at a cost of ~120 million.9
Some assistance is also provided to dislocated workers under the NAFTA Worker Secu-
rity Act and the Employment Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Program.
A vatiety of demonstration programs have also been implemented to test the efficacy
of particular assistance strategies for displaced workers.lo The relatively small size of
these efforts implies that most displaced workers receive relative limited support from the
government, beyond that available to persons who are jobless for other reasons.ll
eGenerally individuals must have worked at lea9t two of the quarters and earned a minimum amount
that is typically between á500 and 53000, dependingon the state, duringthe year prior to the immediately
completed calendar quarter. The claimant must also be available for and able to work if a`suitable' offer
is received.
~Most of the information in this and the next paragraph is obtained from Committee on Ways and
Means (1996).
sA somewhat larger fraction of displaced workers probably qualify for benefits. For instance, data
from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement indicates that 44 percent of 25-64 year olds losing jobs,
between 1993 and 1995, due to plant closings, slack work, or position~ahift abolished between 1993 and
1995 received UI.
sPayments under TAA were much larger in earlier years, peaking at 532,000 persons and S1.6 billion
in 1980.
IoLeigh (1995) and Kodrzycki (1997) provide useful summariesof these programs and their effectiveness.
I1The total budget for dislocated worker pmgrams funded through the Employment and T}aining
42.2 The Netherlands
Minimum wages in the Netherlands aze higher than those in the US. As of July 1998, the
minimum wage is set at 14.01 Dutch guilders (~ 7) per hour before taxes and social security
premium payments.12 In contrast to the US, 75 percent of all employees are covered by
collective agreements, which are negotiated by central bazgaining between (large) firms or
employer organizations and unions. The resulting agreements, called CAOs, are usually,
but not necessazily, put in terms of lower bounds on the terms of employment, notably
the wage. By law of 1927, central agreements reached by worker unions are applicable
to non-union employees as well. By law of 1937, collective agreements can be declared
binding for entire sectors by Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. Such extensions
of the scope of CAOs, shorthanded AW from now on, is indeed common practice.lg
Although there is a tendency towards more flexible employment relations, employment
protection is stronger in the Netherlands than in the US. Employment relationships are
arranged by either fixed term contracts or permanent contracts.14 Fixed term contracts
allow employers to lay off workers at the end of the contracted period without prior
notice or the need of having a permit, and therefore offer no employment protection to
the employee. However, ifthe employee is allowed to continue to work after the contracted
period, or if a new (fixed term) contract is written within 31 days of the end date of the
first contract, the employee is considered to be working on a`continued contract', which
basically provides the protection of a permanent contract.ls We will discuss employment
protection offered by such contracts next.
As long as workers and firms are bound by a contract, they can only separate after a
permit has been granted by a regional employment institution, a rule which is generally
applied to firm-initiated separations only. Employers always need a permit for dismissal
or layoffof workers, except if there is mutual agreement between the employer and the em-
ployee, in case of severe misconduct by the employee (like stealing), in case of banlauptcy
of the employer, or if the employment contract is dissolved by court. Permits aze usually
granted for dismissal because of low performance of the employee, and for layoffs nec-
Administration of the Department of Labor was ál.l billion in fiscal year 1996 (Office of Management
and Budget, 1998).
1~Minimum wages are actually set as monthly wages, and ahould be tranformed to óourly minirnum
wages by dividing by the aector-apecific `normal' working hours. The reported hourly minimum wage is
valid for a 38 hour~week sector. Also, for workera of ages up to 23 yeara lower minirnum wages hold.
laOne of the data sets used in our analyses distinguishea between individuals employed under CAO
contracts or AW, and employees who are not covered by either of these. See Subsection 3.2.
l4In recent years, so called `flexible' contracts are increasingly uaed. Such contracta do not specify
working hours, and correapond more cloaely to US `employment-at-will' contracting. However, in 1996
only 6 percent of all working hours were arranged by auch flexible contracta (CBS, 1998).
~SNote that employers have tried to avoid such `continued contracts' in aeveral ways, for inatance by
offering new contracts after slightly more than 31 days, only. Although auch contracts are not `continued
contacta' formally, employees have been succesaful in fighting such contracting behavior in court. AJso
note that currently laws are prepared that allow for more flexible fixed term contracting, offering lesa
protection to the employce.
5essary for business economic circumstances (displacement). Dismissal because of illness,
marriage, pregnancy and military service is prohibited. Both court cases and permits aze
frequently used as ways to dissolve labor contracts.
Both employers and employees who want to end their employment relationship are
bound by mandatory advance notice requirements. Advance notice periods are always
less than 6 months. Exact durations depend on age, tenure and the type of contract
involved.ls Severance pay is generally provided only in cases were the contract is dissolved
by court, and the employee is not declared `responsible'. In these cases, severance pay is
typically between 1 and 2 months salazies per yeaz of tenure.
In general, assistance to unemployed displaced workers is far more generous in the
Netherlands than in the US. Most important, from the perspective of workers displaced
from private sector jobs, is Unemployment Insurance (UI), which is arranged according
to the Unemployment Law.17 A worker in the Netherlands is entitled to UI benefits if he
or she has been employed for at least 26 weeks in the past 52 weeks, faces a sufficiently
large unpaid reduction in working hours, and is willing to accept a new job.ls Benefits
equal 70 percent of the gross wage in the last job before unemployment, and aze subject
to income tax. The maximum duration of these benefits ranges from 6 months to 5
years, depending on the employment history of the unemployed.19 Some unemployed aze
entitled to an extension of these benefits at a level related to the mandatory minirnum
wage.p If, after the expiration of UI benefits, the unemployed individual has not found a
job, he may receive subsistence benefits (social assistance), which are means (household
income) tested and related to what is considered to be the social minimum income.21 The
Unemployment Law provides some azrangements for `short time unemployment' due to
weather conditions, but no general arrangements for temporazy layoffs, which is, perhaps
for that reason, not an important phenomenon in the Netherlands (see also Emerson,
1988).
18In case of separation, advance notice periods start after a permit has been granted, and equal, if not
specified otherwise in the contract, as a rule the time between two subsequent wage payments, which is
usually 1 month. The employer is also obliged to give advance notice of a number of weeks equal to the
years of tenure, up to a maximum of 13 weeks, with 1 additional week per year of tenure for employees
of age 45-fi5, up to a tnauimum of 26 weeks. Instead, advance notice petiods can also be contracted.
However, it can never be excluded, nor can it exceed 6 months.
17Actually, there are two laws, of 1949 and 1987, which have been revised again in the 1990s.
18We describe UI in 1992~1993, for which we will use administrative data in this chapter. 'The unem-
ployed individual has to face a reduction in his original working hours of at least 5 hours per week, or
half of the original working houra if lesa than 10 hours per week.
19For example, to get an initial benefita entitlement period of 5 years, the unemployed worker has to
have had jobs for at least 40 years and in at least 3 out of the last 5 years prior to the start of the
unemployment spell.
~The extended benefits are equal to 70 percent of the gross minimum wage or 70 percent of the gross
wage in the last job before unemployment, whichever is lower, and are again subject to income tax.
Unemployed who have had jobs in at least 3 out of the last 5 years are eligible for extended benefits, for
a maximum duration of one year, or sometimes longer for older individuals.
alIn general, welfare is applicable to all jobless not in UI, DI, or other schemes, and provides benefits
at the `subsistence level' (currently around á500 after taxes per month for singles without children).
6According to the Unemployment Law, a worker has to prevent unnecessary job loss
in order to be entitled to UI. The administration of the unemployment benefits system,
mainly organized at the level of the industry, is suthorized to impose sanctions on un-
employed who have violated this rule.22 Thus, most displaced workers (in the private
sector) can, to the extent that they do not immediately move into new jobs, be identified
as workers fíowing into UI and not receiving sanctions for `unnecessary job loss'. Because
of the institutional arrangements, this definition restricts attention to both `longer ser-
vice' workers, although not necessarily workers with long tenure on their last jobs, and
to layoffs because of economic reasons. In this context, it also relevant that UI premiums
aze not experience rated at the level of individual firms.~
Especially during some periods in recent history, other social security schemes have
played a role as destinations for displaced workera. Disability Insurance (DI) is a well
known alleged escape route fot displacement.~ In the 1970s and 1980s DI was more
attractive than UI for both employers and employees in terms of replacement rates and,
perhaps, stigma effects. Fhrthermore, in 1990, there were 139 DI claimants to every 1,000
workers in the Netherlands, and only 78 in Sweden and 43 in Germany (Aarts, Dercksen
and De Jong, 1993). As Dutch workers are not likely to run much higher health risks
than workers in Sweden and Germany, this suggests that Dutch DI serves more goals
than just disability insurance.~ Policy changea in the late 1980s and the 1990s have been
directed at preventing abuse of DI. DI replacement rates have been reduced in 1985 and
1987. Stricter rules concerning, and more extensive monitoring of, disability have been
introduced in the 1993 law. As a consequence, the DI stock has, after a continued increase
until 1985, now reduced.
Another possible escape route for displaced workers is early retirement. Since the late
1970s there have been arrangements for retirement before the standard retirement age (65
yeazs), which have been formally arranged by law in 1981. There is some circumstantial
evidence that early retirement may be relevant to worker displacement: labor force partic-
ipation rates of Dutch males over 50 years decrease relatively quickly with age compared
to other OECD countries (Thio, 1997). However, the use of early retirement to avoid
layoff costs in case of displacement is clearly restricted by specific age requirements. Also,
early retirement schemes have recently been incorporated in private so called `flexible
nALso, a UI recipient should (i) take actions to awid staying unemployed, so he has to seazch for ajob
and accept appropriatejob offers, register ae ajob searcher at the public employment office, participate in
education and training, etcetera, and (áà) keep the adminiatrative organization informed about everything
that is relevant to the payment of the unemployment insurance benefits. For more details and references
see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997).
~A small part of cost of UI, roughly 50 percent of the costs induced by UI benefits paid during the
first 13 weeks of unemployment, is covered by premiums related to sectoral unemployment risk.
~DI is arranged by a variety of lawa from 1967 (referring to a law from 1930), 1976, 1993, and is
revised throughout. Also, DI actually conaists oftwo separate arrangementa, one for the firat 52 weeks of
DI, and one for the remaining DI spell. In this chapter, we will simply label both arrangements by `DI'.
See CTSV (1997) for details.
ZSIt should be noted, however, that Dutch DI also covera disability that is not work-related.
7(elderly) pension plans', which may reduce the scope for `abuse' of this scheme. Section
7.2 provides additional information on the role of DI and early retirement.
3 Data
3.1 United States
Significant improvements in data availability have led to an explosion of analysis on US
displaced workers during the last decade. The majority of this research uses information
available from the Displaced Worker Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS). The first DWS was conducted in Januazy 1984, with new supplements released
at two yeaz intervals since that time. Until recently, the surveys collected information for
workers losing jobs in the 5 calendar years prior to the interview date. Beginning in
1994, the surveys were switched from January to February and the period over which job
loss was measured was cut from 5 to 3 years. Information is collected on pre- and post-
displacement job chazacteristics and on the intervening period of joblessness.~ Sample
sizes are reasonably large, the DWS data can be supplemented with the information con-
tained in the normal monthly CPS, and the information is fairly easy to analyze.27 The
new analysis of displacement contained in this chapter will use data from the February
1996 DWS and CPS, and focus on 20 to 64 year old workers (at the survey date) losing
jobs due to plant closing, slack work, or position~shift abolished.
For all its strengths, the DWS has a vaziety of disadvantages. First, the data is
retrospective and subject to recall bias. Second, information is available for only one lost
job and data on company characteristics or the situation prior to displacement is limited.
Most importantly, it is difficult to construct a comparison group of nondisplaced workers.~
This has led some researchers to use longitudinal data sets (such as the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics) or administrative data (e.g. payroll or unemployment insurance
records) to analyze the incidence or consequences of displacement.~ These sources have
advantages, particularly the availability of a comparison group, but also problems. For
instance, sample sizes of displaced workers are typically quite small in panel data and the
reason for job change can frequently not be identified from administrative sources.
~sAnalysis of DWS data typically focusea on `joblessness', rather than `unemployment', since informa-
tion on labor force participation is not available.
ZTFor additional information on the Displaced Worker Supplements, as well asexcellent reviews research
using these and other data sources see (Fallick, 1996 or Kletzer, 1998).
ZsResearchers have used a variety of strategies in an attempt to surmount this shortcoming. For
instance, displacement probabilities are sometimes calculated by assuming that the nuraber of peraons
at risk of permanent layoff (the denominator of the displacement rate) is equal to the number employed
at the survey date. Similarly, the quasi-longitudinal nature of the Current Population Survey Outgoing
Rotation Group data has been used to construct eatimates of the earnings changes of nondisplaced
workers, which can then be compared to those ofjob lasers. Farber (1993) is an example ofa study using
several of these techniques.
~Studies using longitudinal data include Topel (1990); Ruhm (1991a); or Stevens (1997). Administra-
tive data has been utilized by Jacobson, et al. (2993) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996), among others.
83.2 The Netherlands
There is no equivalent to the DWS for the Netherlands. However, we have access to three
micro data sets that contain information on various aspects of displacement: the Firm
Employment (FE) data set, an administrative longitudinal UI data set (of the Dutch
Social Security Council or SVr), and the Labor Force Survey (LFS) of the Netherlands
Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research (OSA). Unlike the DWS, these data
allow, to some extent, for the construction of comparison groups of nondisplaced workers.
However, for some of the analyses sample sizes are small compared to the DWS.
The FE data set is constructed by sampling individuals from administrative records
of firms over the period 1992-1996, and providea information on tenure and separations,
reasons of separations, and a variety of individual and job chazacteristics. The data
provide very useful information on the incidence of displacement, and shed some light on
labor market transitions immediately following displacement. However, the FE data are
silent about subsequent labor market transitions and earnings losses. The UI data set
provides information on unemployment spells of all workers entering UI in 1992. As all
unemployed workers in the mazket sector with sufficiently long employment records end
up in UI, and as we furthermore observe an indicator of worker-initiated separations in
the data, these data can be used to atudy re-employment durations after displacement,
conditioiial on a positive non-employment spell. As we observe to some extent the entire
inflow into UI by sector, municipality and month, we can also construct indicators of
excessive inflow into UI, which can be seen as indicators ofexcessive, or even mass, layoffs.
Earnings losses are however not observed in this data set either. For this we require the
LFS data, a labor force panel survey covering the period 1985-1990. The LFS data set
provides extensive information on labor market transitions and eaznings, but suffers from
small numbers of displaced workers.
In sum, the data allow for the analysis of the incidence of displacement and of la-
bor market states occupied just after being displaced, and provide information on re-
employment durations for those with positive spells of joblessness. ALso, the LFS data
allow for a rough estimate of earnings lo~sses induced by displacement, and provide some
information on labor market states occupied some time after displacement. As these data
sets have not been used to study displacement before, we will discuss the Dutch data in
somewhat more detail.
3.2.1 The Firm Employment data
The Firm Employment (FE) data (or Arbeidsvoorwaardenonderzoek in Dutch) are firm-
worker data collected by civil servants (of the Labor Inspection) of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, and provide information on the incidence of displacement over
the period 1992-1996. The data are collected yearly (in October 1993-1996) as repeated
cross sections from administrative wage records of asample of firms by means of a stratified
2 steps sampling procedure.
Each year, in the first step a sample of firms (about 2,000 in each yeaz) is drawn from
9the Ministry's own database (which is roughly similar to the firms database of Statistics
Netherlands, CBS). In the second step, a sample of workers (about 26,000 per year) is
drawn from the records of the firms selected in the first step. The workers are sampled
from administrative records of two moments in time, one year before the sampling date
and at the sampling date. A distinction is made between employees who aze present in
both years (`stayers'), workers who are only present in the first year (`leavers') and workers
who aze only present in the second year (`entrants'). More than 75 percent of the workers
are stayers. Information is obtained on the way leavers separate from firms, which can be
used to distinguish between displacement and other sepazations. Details aze discussed in
Subsection 4.2.
The data set includes additional information on wages, hours worked, days worked and
a number of other variables (e.g. age, tender, sex, education, job complexity, occupation,
SIC industry codes, firm size and type of wage contract). Appendix A provides more
detazls.
3.2.2 The UI data set
The UI data are provided by the Dutch Social Security Council (SVr) and are adminis-
trative data from the sectoral organizations that implement the unemployment insurance
system. The data cover all individuals who stazted collecting UI benefits in 1992. If nec-
essary, individuaLs aze followed up to September 1993. Note that, for a given individual,
the date of inflow into UI as a rule coincides with the date of inflow into unemployment.
For each individual we know the duration of being in UI, except when it is right-censored
by the end of the observation period (late 1993). If the UI duration is completed then we
know the exit state, which is usually either employment (56 percent) or unemployment
after completion of UI entitlement (12 percent). Only 7 percent of the spells end because
of transition into DI, and hardly any UI spell in our sample ends in retirement. We do
not have information on events occurring after leaving UI.
We observe whether individuals have had a sanction imposed right at the stazt of
the UI spell. These sanctions aze punitive benefit reductions that are applied if the UI
applicant is considered to be (partially) responsible for his job loss. Thus, this vaziable
can be used to control for worker-initiated separations, as far as these are not excluded
by restricting attention to the UI inflow. Otherwise, the number of explanatory variables
is limited due to the administrative character of the data set. Furthermore, the data do
not contain the exact magnitude of the individual UI benefits level. However, this is a
monotone function of the wage easned before entering unemployment, affected by personal
and household chazacteristics. The wage as well as these characteristics are observed. The
data only provide very limited information on the individual maximum UI entitlement,
except of course when the individual is observed to complete entitlement. Appendix B
gives details.
103.2.3 The Labor Force Survey of the OSA
The OSA Labor Supply Panel Survey, or just Labor Force Survey (LFS), is a panel which
started in 1985. Presently four waves are available (April-May 1985, August-0ctober
1986, August-October 1988, and August-November 1990). In the LFS a random sample
of households in the Netherlands is followed over time. Because the study concentrates on
individuals who are between 15 and 61 years of age and who are not full-time students,
only households with at least one person in this category aze included. All individuals
(and in all cases the head of the household) in this category are interviewed. The first
wave consists of 4,020 individuals (in 2,132 households). The four waves together contain
information on 8,121 individuals.
In every interview, retrospective questions aze asked to provide information on possible
labor market transitions made by the respondent, during the period between the last and
current interview.30 This allows for a reconstruction of the sequence of labor mazket
states occupied by 8,075 respondents and the sojourn times and income levels in these
states.31 The LFS data distinguish employment, self-employment, unemployment, not-
in-labor-force, military service, and full-time education as labor market states.32 For each
transition between two of these labor mazket states, the respondent is asked to provide
a motive or cause, and to indicate whether the transition was made voluntarily.~ This
information enables us to distinguish displacement from other separations. We will come
back to this issue in Subsection 5.2. Appendix C provides details.
4 Incidence of displacement
4.1 United States
Farber (1997) has recently estimated displacement probabilities, over three yeaz periods,
using information from all of the available Displaced Worker Supplements. A crude es-
timate of annual job loss due to plant closing, slack work, or position~shift abolished is
obtained by dividing his estimated values by three.~ These results, displayed in Table 1,
~Thus, we do not miss tranaitioas made between to conaecutive interview dates (assuming recall errors
are absent).
31We exclude 46 individuals for which the interviews in which they participated are not succ~sive.
ALso, this reconstruction covers at mast the five year period 1985 until the end of 1990 for reepondents
who participated in all waves, and some retrospective information on the state occupied at the date of
the first interview. See Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) for an analysis of attrition using
these data. They find that the effects of attrition on estimatea of transition models are unimportant.
aaUnemployment and nobin-the-labor-force are distinguished by requiring unemployed to actively
search for a job.
aaJob-to-job changes are recorded. The motive or cause are selected from an extensive list.
~Farber (1997) includes job loes for `other' reasons in his analysis. We have deleted these persons from
our calculations. In a recent analysis of additional dats collected on respondents to the 1996 DWS who
report being displaced for `other' reasons, Farber (1998) concludes that fewer than one~uarter ofpersons
giving this response had `inwluntary' job lossea (and some of theae may have left temporary or seavonai
11reveal displacement rates of between 2 and 4 percent per year, with higher probabilities
for males than females. Displacements aze somewhat countercyclical but there is little
indication of a time trend.as
There are at least two reasons why these estimates understate displacement probabil-
ities. First, the DWS records a maximum of one job loss during the three-year period,
thus missing multiple separations~ Second, the surveys suffer from recall bias, whereby
terminations occurring further in the past are more likely to be forgotten (Topel, 1990;
Evans and Leighton, 1995). Table 2 provides estimates of annual displacement rates for
the 1993-1995 period, with an attempt made to correct for recall bias (but not multiple
separations). The top panel shows estimates for all types of displacements, whereas the
second is limited to job loss resulting in an initial period of joblessness. This is done to
make the results more comparable to those of some of the other countries, where data
limitations restrict the analysis to displacements that lead to unemployment.
The first row of each panel shows estimated displacement rates for all workers and
separately by sex. The `correction' involves assuming that the number of persons dis-
placed in 1993 and 1994 is the same as the number reporting a job loss in 1995. For
example, 47.5 percent of displaced workers in the 1996 DWS reporting losing their jobs
in 1995, whereas this group should account for only one-third of the sample, if termi-
nations occurred uniformly across the sample period. This suggests that the number of
displacements is understated by almost 43 percent (.475~.333 - 1.426) and that the cor-
rected annual displacement probability is 4.4 percent (.031 x 1.426 -.044). A similar
procedure yields a 4.7 percent rate of annual job loss for men and 4.1 percent probability
for women.37 The corresponding entry in the bottom panel deflates the displacement
probability by the percentage of job losers who obtain new employment without an in-
tervening spell of nonemployment. For instance, 14.4 percent of displaced individuals do
not experience any initial joblessness, implying that 3.8 percent (.044 x.856 -.038) are
expected to lose positions and become jobless.
The remainder of the table provides estimates of annual displacement rates as a func-
tion of tenure in the predisplacement job. Since Farber (1997) does not break down his
statistics by tenure, additional steps aze required to obtain these estimates. First, the
(predisplacement) tenure distribution of workers losing jobs between 1993 and 1995 is
calculated from the 1996 DWS. Second, the job tenure of all (20~4 year old) workers in
jobs).
3sALso see Hall (1995) for estimates of displacement rates using a variety alternative data sources and
methods. Hamermesh (1989) estimates that displacement ratea were 20 to 40 percent higher in the 1980s
than the 1970s.
~sThe issue of multiple turnover is discussed in Ruhm (1987) and plays a key role in the analysis of
Stevens (1997). Farber (1997) provides an indication of its importance for early waves of the DWS.
37Males and females losing jobs in 1995 account for 46.2 and 48.5 percent of the 1996 DWS samples,
implying inflation factors of 1.387 (.462~.333) and 1.456 (.485~.333) respectively. In the absence of recall
bias, observed displacements might be concentrated in the later years if the rate of job loss actually
increased over time. However, given that the economy was improving (unemployment fell from 6.9
percent in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1995) this seems unlikely.
12February 1996 is calculated using data from the monthly CPS. Third, a relative risk of
displacement is calculated by dividing the share of displaced workers in a tenure group
by the corresponding share for all workers. Finally, this relative risk is multiplied by the
aggregate displacement rate to arrive at a probability of job loss for each tenure cate-
gory. For example, persons with 1-2 years preseparation tenure accounted for 26.8 of
displaced workers but just 13.2 percent of the nondisplaced, implying a relative risk of
2.03 (.268~.132) and an estimated annual displacement rate of 8.9 percent (2.03 x.044).
This procedure is performed separately for men and women, as well as for both together.
Table 2 shows an almost monotonic negative relationship between job tenure and the
probability of job loss. For example, persons holding jobs for ten or more years are only
about one-fourth as likely to be displaced as those in positions that have lasted for just
a year or two. The one exception to this pattern is that persons in the first year of the
job appear to have somewhat lower displacement rates than those with one to two years
of tenure. This result is probably erroneous for two reasons. First, recall bias is probably
most severe for very short tenure workers, since these persons may incur few adjustment
problems when these positions end.~ Second, information on predisplacement tenure is
inissing for 11 percent of displaced workers and these individuals are excluded from the
calculations in the table. If, as is likely, the missing data is disproportionately for very
brief employment spells, the share of displacements and the corresponding risk of job loss
will understated for this group. Overall, the evidence strongly suggests that displacement
rates fall with job tenure.as
4.2 The Netherlands
Sufficiently long displacement rate time series can be constructed from aggregate UI data,
giving the yearly numbers of new UI cases, and data on the number of employed indi-
viduals at risk. The merits of the first series as a measure of displacement have been
discussed in Subsections 2.2 and 3.2. Although it provides only an imperfect measure of
displacement, it is the only measure for which we can construct time series over several
business cycles. A more complete measure of aggregate displacement can be computed
from the FE data on a much shorter time interval. This measure and the differences with
the UI measure will be discussed later.
Ideally, one would like to measure the second series as the number of unemployed
individuals who would be eligible for UI benefits in case of dismissal. Unfortunately,
we have to approximate this series by the number of employed individuals paying UI
premiums. As this includes individuals with employment histories that are insufficient
~A common inflation factor is used to account for the effects of recall bias - no attempt is made to
differentially to do so asa functíon ofjob seniority. In fact, 58 percent of observed displacements involving
those with less than one year oftenure occur in 1995, suggesting that recall bias is particularly severe for
this group.
39A multivariate analysis by Farber (1993) indicates a strong monotonic decline in the riak of job
loss with tenure. Fallick (1996) summarizes evidence suggesting that the protective effect of tenure ia
decreasing over time.
13for UI eligibility, this provides an upper bound to the number of individuals at risk. As a
consequence, the rate computed is a lower bound on the true rate of displacement leading
to positive unemployment spells.
Figure 1 graphs the annual displacement rate time series constructed in this manner,
together with real GDP growth in the Netherlands (percentage change from previous
yeaz) for the period 1970-1993. The rate of displacement is clearly trending upwards over
the data period, rising from around 4 percent in 1970 up to 11 percent in 1993.`w As
to be expected, we also observe strong fluctuations over the business cycle, with steep
increases in 1970-1972, 1973-1975, 1979-1982, 1986-1987, and 1990-1993. Compazing
this to the superimposed macro indicator, real GDP growth, we see that displacement
rates aze counter-cyclical. Notable exceptions are 197fr1977, 1984-1985, and 1989-1990,
which are all years with decreasing growth and displacement rates. A simple explanation
could be that the downturns of the business cycle lead worker displacement, although
this seems not true for the early 1970s. However, the correlation between both series is
-0.58. A regression of displacement on GDP growth and time shows that displacement
changes -0.33 (s.e. 0.12) percentage points for each percentage point increase in real
GDP growth, and 0.15 (s.e. 0.03) percentage points per year (R2 - 0.69). We do not find
significant coefficients for one and two yeaz lagged GDP growth.
The FE data can be used to study the vaziation of displacement over groups of work-
ers.41 For each separation, information is available that is helpful in identifying displace-
ment. Among other things, the data distinguish layoffs, sepazations because of expiration
of fixed term contracts, and transitions into other jobs, DI, and eazly and normal retire-
ment.~ It should be understood that this information comes from administrative records
of the separating firm, and is therefore limited by the observational scope of the firm's
administration. For instance, a worker who is given notice of layoff in the near future
may immediately quit into another job (before the date of layoff) to avoid unemployment.
In this case, the worker is most likely to be recorded as a job-to-job mover, without any
reference to the layoff. However, a worker who stays with the firm until the date of layoff
is most likely to be recorded as a laid off worker. Then, the data do not provide informa-
tion on the labor market state occupied by the worker just after displacement. Similar
azguments can be made for workers moving into DI or early retirement. For instance, for
a worker observed to move into early tetirement, we do not have independent information
on the circumstances leading to early retirement. Thus, the causes of separations and
destinations of labor market transitions following separations are intertwined in the data,
and we have to decide upon a proper way to identify displacement.
~Note that we will show later that displacement rates are again lower in 1994-1996.
41Analyses based on the FE data draw on results from a project oncrowding out of low akilled workers,
in which three of the authors are inwlved at the CPB Netherlands Buresu for Economic Policy Analysis
in The Hague.
~aNote that we only observe that workers are on a fixed term contract once they separate for that
reason, so that we cannot exclude these workers from the data set. However, this is not a serious problem
as we condition on tenure, which seems more relevant as a determinant of the risk set for displacement.
14We have opted for the following method. For all firms, workers under age 60 with
tenure of at least one year who are recorded to be laid off are considered to be displaced.
As azgued above, some displaced workers who immediately find a new job, or move into DI
or early retirement, will be excluded by this definition ofdisplacement. To include at least
some of these cases, we will label leavers moving into new jobs, DI or early retirement from
`strongly shrinking' flrms to be displaced as well. Since there is no a pràori reason to pick
any particular threshold employment loss level separating strongly shrinking firms from
other firms, we have experimented with a number of different criteria. The results can
be found in Table 3, which gives the contributions to the annual displacement rate over
the period 1993-1996 of separations from strongly shrinking firms by type of separation
for 6 different criteria. The first question is whether we should focus on net or gross
employment (outflow) changes. Using the latter, we will overestimate displacement rates
in high turnover sectors, where high simultaneous employment inflow and outflow rates are
no exception, whereas using the former we underestimate displacement at restructuring
firms.`~ The weakest criterium in Table 3 results in an aggregate annual displacement
rat.e of 7.2 percent, while the strongest criterium results in an aggregate displacement rate
of 3.5 percent, over the 1993-1996 period. With all criteria, we find that most workers
displaced from strongly shrinking firms are labeled as moving into new jobs directly, and
slightly less as being laid off. Early retirement and, in particular, DI seem of minor
importance. However, again note that some of the workera labeled as being laid off could
have rnoved into new jobs, early retirement or DI. We return to this issue in Subsection
5.2.
In what follows we use the `net employment' criterium, mainly because other authors
in this volume (Denmark, Belgium) do the same. As we have firm level data, we use a-30
percent threshold, instead of the -40 percent threshold employed by the other suthors,
who apply it to plant level data.
First, we will give a short description of the vaziation in displacement rates over time
and between different categories of workers. Table 4 shows that displacement rates do
not differ much between males and females and that displacement rates are much lower
for workers with high tenure. Note that, despite the institutional differences, the results
aze very similar to the results for the US in Table 2.~ In the Netherlands, however, the
displacement rate decreases faster with tenure. In both countries, low tenure males have
higher displacement rates than low tenure females, whereas at the highest tenure levels
females have higher displacement rates than males. Table 5 shows that displacement rates
are highest in 1993 and lowest in 1996. As 1993 is the year with the lowest (and even
~If, for example, Philips displaces all workers at its computer division and at the same time expands
its audio and video divisions, we will undereatimate the true displacement rate when we use the net
employment criterium.
~The low displacement rate of the lowest tenure group could be an artefact of the FE sampling
procedure, which undersamples workers that separate within ayear (see Subsection 3.2; note that the FE
data are administrative and cannot suffer from recall bias like the DWS possibly does). Alternstively,
the nonmonotonicity could be explained by a learning model along the lines of Jovanovic (1979).
15negative) net employment growth and the Dutch economy has strongly recovered since
1995, this is consistent with countercyclical displacement rates. We also find that workers
covered by a collective agreement (CAO) have lower displacement rates than workers
whose wage contract is bound (by the minister) to follow CAO contracts of other firms
in the same sector (AW), and workers with individual contracts only.45 The fact that
displacement rates are highest for AW workers could reflect the fact that firms aze bound
to pay wages that aze agreed upon by other firms to such workers. As such, these wages
may not reflect the business economic conditions of AW firms. It is also interesting to see
that displacement rates for workers at simple jobs, for workers with little formal training,
and for young workers aze relatively high: This is in line with standard labor hoazding
and human capital theories. Finally, we see that displacement rates decline by age.
We further investigate the results in Table 5 by estimating a logit model for the inci-
dence of displacement. As the net marginal benefits ofdisplacing a worker will typically be
influenced by macroeconomic conditions, we do not only include firm and worker chazac-
teristics, but also sets of calendar time and sectoral dummies. It is important to point out
that some of the variables that are used as explanatory variables may well be endogenous.
Employed workers who have been relatively successful at avoiding displacement in the
past may have a high current tenure as well as a low current probability of displacement.
Employed workers who by accident have been promoted to a job with fringe benefits that
exceed what they can get at other employers may have a high current tenure as well as
a high current probability of displacement. Such endogeneity may bias the parameter
estimates. Table 6 gives the corresponding estimates. The displacement probability de-
creases with tenure (up to some level), and with gross hourly wages and it increases with
educational and job complexity level, and it is also relatively high for workers without
collective contracts.and workers employed at large firms.
Using these estimates, we compute displacement probabilities for different types of
workers. We evaluate these probabilities at the estimated pazameter values and the mean
observed characteristics. Table 7 illustrates the partial effects of the different worker and
firm characteristics. Some differences with the explorative results from Table 5 are found.
Controlling for other chazacteristics, the displacement probability is no longer decreasing
with education and job complexity level, displacement probabilities now hardly depend
on the type of contract. It appeazs that in particular young, low wage and low tenure
workers face a large probability to be displaced. According to the logit model, a worker
with average characteristics who earns 15 guilders an hour faces a 4.3 percent chance to be
displaced, whereas this probability is only 1.1 percent for a worker who earns 50 guilders
an hour. This is not a surprising result if wages are determined by a surplus sharing rule,
in which case matches with the highest surplus have the lowest probability to end.
Finally, note that displacement rates calculated with the FE data set are lower than
the UI inflow time series figures because we only observe very few firm closíngs. Also,
the aggregate UI inflow measure does not exclude individuals with sanctions, although
45See Subsection 2.2 for a discussion of collective agreements in the Netherlands.
16we know from the UI data that around 13 percent of the inflow into UI in 1992 cannot be
considered displaced according to the sanction indicator (see Section 3.2 and Subsection
5.2). Furthermore, we include individuals who only lose part of their job in the UI data,
and we do not exclude low tenure individuals. In the analysis of earnings losses with the
LFS data we lose one third of the displaced workers if we restrict the sample to workers
with tenure of at least 1 yeaz (see Section 6.2). Clearly, the UI eligibility requirements
would prevent most of these low tenure workers to end up in UI, but someoverestimation of
the incidence of displacement because of this reason with the UI data seems unavoidable.
On the other hand, the analyses on the LFS data in Subsection 5.2 also suggest that a
large proportion of displaced workers in the Netherlands experiences no unemployment
spells at all, which implies that the UI data may well underestimate the true displacement
rate.
5 Labor market transitions after displacement
5.1 United States
Job loss increases the risk that an individual will be out-of-work for at least some period.
For instance, Swaim and Podgursky (1991) estimate that the median worker is jobless for
25 to 30 weeks following a permanent layoff. And Farber (1993) finds that 29 to 38 percent
of males displaced during the previous two years are unemployed at the DWS interview
date, versus 4 to 5 percent of the nondisplaced.~ However, much of the employment
reduction is temporary. Ruhm (1991a) estimates that unemployment increases by around
8 weeks in the year of the permanent layoff, 4 weeks in the next yeaz, but by only around
1 week four years after the event.
Tables 8 and 9 indicate the patterns of postdisplacement joblessness and labor force
status using data from the 1996 DWS. The first table shows the probability that workers
obtain new jobs within either 6 months or 1 yeaz. By European standazds, nonemployment
spells in the US aze brief, with almost 70 percent reemployed in 6 months or less and
nearly 80 percent within a year. Almost two-thirds of those with an initial spell of
joblessness aze working again with 6 months and three-quarters in less than one year.
Males and short tenure workers obtain new jobs somewhat faster than females and those
with greater seniority. The age differences in reemployment are fairly small through the
late forties, however, workers beyond that age are much more likely to have extended spells
ofjoblessness. This may represent greater adjustment difficulties, following displacement,
but it could also confound the effects of job loss and retirement. We return to this point
below.
Groups obtaining new jobs rapidly generally have relatively high rates of survey date
employment. However, as shown in Table 9, the patterns of unemployment and labor
asDisplacements are aLso associated with lower employment probabilities for females, although the
differences are less dramatic than for men.
17force participation are more divergent. In particular, the relatively low employment rates
of mature adults and women are explained by high rates of labor force withdrawal, rather
than elevated unemployment. ALso, persons displaced from job lasting less than a yeaz
have low employment probabilities, despite their apparent ability to find new positions
quickly. A plausible explanation is that these are unstable workers with frequent transi-
tions into and out of jobs.
Econometric estimates of the determinants of postdisplacement joblessness are sum-
marized in Table 10. The first column shows results of a probit equation where the
dependent vaziable equals one for persons finding new jobs without any intervening job-
lessness and zero for those who are out of work for at least one week. The second, shows
results of a Cox proportional hazard model where the dependent variable is weeks of job-
lessness and the sample is restricted to those out-of-work for at least one week. The third
shows corresponding hazard estímates for the full sample, where the dependent variable
is weeks of joblessness plus one-half. Thus, the second column indicates hazard rates,
conditional on a positive spell, while the third shows results for the unconditional model
(that includes both zero and positive week spells). The excluded reference category is a
white unmarried female high school dropout, born outside the US, with less than one yeaz
of predisplacement tenure, aged 20 to 29, who loses a job due to position~shift abolished,
and receives no written advance notice. A higher hazard rate implies faster exit from
joblessness and shorter spells.
The results are generally consistent with those in earlier research. Nonemployment
declines with education, increases with age, and is higher for nonwhites than whites.
Males are just as likely as females to experience some joblessness but transition into
employment more quickly. Conversely, married and native-born persons are more likely
than their counterparts to move directly into new jobs but once out-of-work show little
evidence of faster reemployment. Long tenure workers have relatively high probabilities
of avoiding joblessness but have relatively low reemployment hazard rates, conditional on
a positive spell. Persons involved in plant closings are more likely to move directly into
new positions than those losíng jobs due to position~shift abolished and have elevated
reemployment hazards relative to both this group and those displaced by slack work.47
Individuals receiving lengthy written notice aze more likely than the non-notified to avoid
joblessness but the notice does not appear to have any effect on reemployment hazard
rates, and the exit probabilities of those with briefnotice are actually lower than for those
not receiving written warnings.`~
47This is consistent with Gibbons and Katz's (1991) evidence that workers displaced by plant closings
are reemployed more quickly than those losing jobs due to slack work or position~shift abolished. They
attribute this to the possibility that plant closings affect a relatively random gmup of workers, whereas
the other types of job loss impact those of lower average quality.
4sFinding that advance notice is associated with lower rates of joblessness but without reductions in
durations, conditional on a positive apell, is common in this literature (e.g. see Addison and Portugal,
1987; or Ehrenberg and Jakubson, 1989). Ruhm (1992, 1994) e~camines the evidence that persons with
short written notice have longer spells and concludes that this occurs because firms disproportionately
provide voluntazy notice to workers with unobserved characteristics conelated with low reemployment
185.2 The Netherlands
Both the LFS and the FE data provide some information on the labor market states
occupied by workers just after displacement.
In the LFS, three transitions qualify for displacement, i.e. job-to-job transitions (E-
E), transitions from employment to unemployment (E-U), and transitions from employ-
ment to not-in-the-labor-force (E-N). As noted eazlier, the LFS provides a self-reported
motive or cause for each transition in the data set, and it provides information on whether
or not the transition was made voluntarily. This information can be used to identify dis-
placement. For instance, if `reorganization~plant closure' is reported as a cause for leaving
a job, the worker is clearly displaced. There are several other motives which could indicate
displacement. For instance, displacement could also have occurred through DI, in which
case disability may be reported as a cause for leaving employment. In deciding which
motivation-voluntariness combinations identify displacement, we have to realize that the
reported motivations and voluntariness are heavily liable to subjective perceptions (like
the distinction between a quit and a layoff). Having this in mind, we have decided to
consider transitions with the following motivation-voluntariness pairs as displacement.
The motivation 'I would have lost my job anyway' will most likely be applicable to
situations in which people anticipate displacement. In this case we take both voluntary
as involuntary transitions, because there seems to be no reason to believe that one or the
other excludes displacement. The same holds for the cause 'reorganization~plant closure'.
With respect to the motivation 'early retirement' involuntary transitions seem most likely
to denote displacement. Voluntary early retirements will probably cover individuals who
prefer to stop working irrespective of economic conditions in the firm, and these individuals
would have reported 'lost job anyway' in case of displacement. Finally, we have the
transitions into DI. For this motivation we distinguish between E-E and E-U transitions
on the one hand and E-N on the other. We think that in case of a E-E or E-U
transition, both voluntary and involuntary transitions denote displacement, because these
people keep working or are seazching for a job after the transition, so they are not really
incapacitated for work.49 In case an E-N transition is made, we assume that displacement
is indicated by voluntary transitions, while involuntary transitions will cover transitions
for pure medical reasons.
Table 11 shows the number of displaced workers by transition and motivation in our
sample. In total we observe 327 displacements. The lazge majority, 70 percent, involves
job-to-job transitions. This can be contrasted with the US, where many more workers
experience a positive non-employment spell. As for motivations, in most cases (68 percent)
displacement is indicated by the most clear-cut motivation, 'reorganization~plant closure'
probabilities. Previous research also showa that union memberahip, high predisplacement earnings and
depressed local labor market conditions are associated with e~ctended joblessness (aee Fallick, 1996 for
examples).
49Although this may be due to DI legislation. Partly disabled workera have to find a job for their
remaining work capacity. We cannot distinguish these casea. However, this rule came into effect in 1987,
so it only affects observations in part of our observation period (See Hassink, Van Ours, Ridder, 1997).
19(of which 73 percent involves no joblessness). Only a small share is due to DI (17 percent)
or early retirements (1 percent). If we restrict attention to workers with tenure of at least
1 year, only 162 displacements aze left. However, qualitatively similar results hold for this
subsample.
As we stated before, the FE data also give some information on the labor market state
just after displacement. From the discussion of this data set it should be clear that this
labor market state is not observed for those displaced workers who are labeled as being
laid off. However, firms are likely to be involved in arranging DI and, in particular, early
retirement for workers if these destinations are really used as convenient ways to displace
workers, in which case we may expect that these transitions are actually recorded. Simi-
larly, because of employment protection regulation, we may expect that firms are involved
in re-employing displaced workers, and that at least some job-to-job transitions of dis-
placed workers are recorded. In any case, the share of layoffs in overall displacement only
provides an upper bound to the share of displaced workers ending up in unemployment
right after being displaced.
Table 13 compares the layoff rates, job-to-job transition rates, DI inflow rates, and
early retirement rates between 30 percent shrinking firms and other firms. We see that
not only the layoff rates but also the other separation probabilities are higher at the
30 percent shrinking firms. This seems to indicate that at least some displaced workers
enter DI or early retirement, or move into another job directly. However, the second row
for each type of firms shows that a relatively high share of separations from shrinking
firms are labeled as layoffs, and relatively few as job-to-job transitions. So, most of the
displacement seems to be captured by layoffs.
The LFS data also provide information on the labor market states occupied by dis-
placed workers 12 months after displacement. Table 12 gives the number of individuals
in the different labor market states, by type of transition made just after displacement.~
The table shows that most individuals aze still in the same state as when they became
displaced. We cannot derive strong results on E-U and E-N transitions, because of the
limited amount of individuals in this category, but for job-to-job movers it seems that
they do not have problems finding steady employment after being displaced.
Finally, we can analyze re-employment durations following displacement using the 1992
UI inflow data set. We distinguish individuals who have been sanctioned for responsibility
for job loss, and individuals who have not been sanctioned. Only the latter aze considered
to be displaced. The sanctioned individuals may then serve as a`control' group, where
we should acknowledge that this group only contains individuals who are eligible for UI
benefits, and no individuals who have for instance quit their jobs, or that have been
dismissed for severe misconduct. Also, the groups may differ for two reasons other than
cause of separation. First, the `non-displaced' individuals have been sanctioned, which
implies that they will face reduced benefits for at least some period of time. Second,
soThe total number of observations is smaller than in Table 11, becauae in some cases information on
sojourn times was missing.
20workers are likely to be non-randomly selected into both states, for which we will not
directly control.
Table 14 presents summary statistics of re-employment durations by demographic
group. As 44 percent of the durations are right-censored, we compute median durations,
in particulaz median residual durations at 0 and 26 weeks. From the upper panel we
learn that the median re-employment duration of all spells is 20.8 weeks. For displaced
workers, the median duration is 3.5 weeks shorter than for sanctioned workers. The
median residual durations at 26 weeks are 4-5 times larger, implying strong negative
duration dependence of the corresponding re-employment hazard rates. It is well known
~,that this can both be explained by `genuine' duration dependence at the individual level,
e.g. because of stigma effects or atrophy of skills, and dynamic sorting because of exit
rate heterogeneity.sl The lower panel restricts attention to displa.ced workers, and gives
median durations for various demographic groups.
Apart from the sanction variable, we develop another indicator of displacement, or,
more precisely, a proxy for excess firings in the local labot market of each individual.
From the UI inflow census we can compute the size of the inflow in UI in each month of
1992 in each Dutch municipality by sector. Thus, we can distinguish local labor markets
by municipality and sector, and define excess UI inflow in a local labor market to be the
inflow into UI in that market net of the overall average inflow over time, municipality
and sect.or. More formally, if c,,,,t is the inflow in UI in municipality m in sector s
in month t, then data on c,,,,c for all municipalities, sectors, and months in 1992 are
regressed on municipality, sector and time dummies, yielding both predicted counts "c,,,,c
and residual counts Ê,,,,c - c,,,,t - c,,,,c for each cell or (m, s, t). Now, each combination
(m, s) represents a local labor market, and the Ê,,,,t is an indicator of excess firings in
local labor market (m, s) in month t. We can assign each individual to a local labor
market, and use Ê as a regressor in an analysis of re-employment durations. As we
will, for computational reasons, only include province indicators, instead of municipality
indicators, in the duration analysis, it is useful to also include c as a regressor.
The duration model for re-employment durations is specified as a single risk mixed
proportional hazard (MPH) model, with the log hazard for re-employment given by
logB(t~x,v) - a(t) f x'(i f v, where a is a piecewise constant log baseline hazard, and
Q is the regressor parameter vector. x is a regressor vector containing both the sanction
indicator, the cell or local labor mazket indicators, and other individual characteristics. v
is an unobserved component which is assumed to be discretely distributed, so that, with
n points of support, Pr(v - v;) - p;, for i- 1, ... ,n, and p„ - 1- ~i i p;.52 We will fix
s1See for instance, Lancaster (1979). The fact that median reaidual durations are now longer for
displaced workers can possibly be traced back to heterogeneity in terms of unobserved and other observed
characteristics. Earlier analyses of the same data by Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997) indeed
show that both negative genuine duration dependence and obaerved and unobserved heterogeneity play
a significant role in explaining the obaerved duration dependency pattern.
szBecause of their flexibility and computational convenience, discrete distributions for unobservables
are frequently used in MPH analyses. The 9exibility of discrete distributions as heterogeneity, or mixture,
21the number of mass points at n- 2, and perform sensitivity analysis by re-estimating the
model for higher values of n. Finally, we treat destinations different from re-employment
as randomly right-censoring the re-employment durations. Also, we have right-censoring
because of the fact that individuals are only followed until late 1993.
Table 15 shows results from maximum likelihood estimation. The most important
finding is that individuals who are displaced according to the sanction indicator, i.e. who
do not have sanctions imposed, have approximately 20 percent higher re-employment
rates than sanctioned individuals. Considering the fact that sanctions, if they have any
direct effect, are likely to increase re-employment rates, this figure provides a lower bound
on the difference between displaced and non-displaced workers, given a similar benefits
level. The excess firings indicator, the `residual size of the cell', has a significantly positive
effect on re-employment rates, which could be explained as a signalling effect. Workers
that are involved in excess, or even mass, firings, are more attractive than workers that
are singled out for layoff. This result is consistent with the findings of Gibbons and Katz
(1991) for the US, who find that workers displaced because of plant closing have shorter
re-employment durations than workers laid off because of slack work or elimination of
a position or shift. It is also interesting to note that the predícted size of the local
labor market has a significantly negative effect on re-employment rates, which could be a
symptom of congestion effects on local labor markets. It should be noted that this variable
is identified on variation between municipalities only, as the model contains full sets of
time and sector dummies. Wage has a significantly positive effect on re-employment rates,
and age a significantly negative effect (from age 16 onwards). Wald test statistics for the
joint significance of the three sets of dummies show that there is significant variation (at a
5 percent level) across sectors, months of inflow and provinces. Most of the variation in re-
employment rates between cells or local labor markets is caused by sectoral heterogeneity.
Finally, we find significant unobserved heterogeneity and negative individual duration
dependence of re-employment rates.sa
Table 16 gives re-employment probabilities computed with the estimated model, by
fixing the unobserved heterogeneity component at its estimated mean and the regressors
at the sample mean, and considering one-by-one deviations of regressors from this mean.
Of the displaced workers 55 percent (73 percent) is re-employed within 26 weeks (52
weeks). For sanctioned individuals these probabilities are slightly lower. We still find
distributions is illustrated by a result of Heckman and Singer (1984), who ahow that in MPH models the
non-parametric mAY~mum likelihood estimator of the heterogeneity distribution is a discrete distribution.
However, the estimation procedure requires the number of points ofsupport not to be fixed in advance,
and estimation of standard errors is not straightforward.
s3The table includes an Information Matrix (IM) test on the unobserved heterogeneity parameters
(see White, 1982). Chesher (1984) has shown that this test on the equality of the score and Hessian
representations of the IM can be interpreted a9 a test on local parameter variation. In this case, the
IM test can be expected to detect additional unobserved heterogeneity, and can be shown to be XZ
distributed with 2 degrees of freedom. Thus, the IM equaGty is just rejected at a 5 percent significance
level. However, adding an additional mass point to the heterogeneity distribution does not change the
results: two mass points converge to the same value and other parameter estimates are unaffected.
22strong negative effects of age on re-employment probabilities. Wages have positive effects
on re-employment probabilities, ceteris parióus, which overturns the results from the raw
median estimates.
6 Earnings and wage changes
6.1 United States
In addition to transitory increases in joblessness, labor displacement in the United States
is frequently accompanied by substantial and lasting wage reductions. Several studies
have examined these earnings losses in detail, using longitudinal or administrative data
to allow a comparison group of nondisplaced workers. Using the Panel Study of Inwme
Dynamics, Ruhm (1991a) finds that job loss reduces weekly wages by 14 to 18 percent in
the following year and 11 to 15 percent 4 yeazs later, with little evidence ofrecovery beyond
this point. A more recent study of the same data source by Stevens (1997) indicates
average decreases of roughly the same magnitude and pattern but further highlights that
large losses aze concentrated among persons experiencing repeated turnover. Jacobson et
al.'s (1993) analysis of administrative data for Pennsylvania workers with 6 or more years
of tenure on the predisplacement job uncovers a similar time profile and even larger losses
- quarterly earnings decline by 30 to 40 percent initially, with persistent losses of 20 to 30
percent. The variance of wage changes is also large. For example, early studies by Ruhm
(1987) or Kletzer (1991) point out that many workers eazn more after job loss than before
it. Storer and Van Audenrode (1997) suggest that this uncertainty is a major source of
the utility losses resulting from displacement, far outweighing the comparatively modest
reduction in average wages.
Tables 17 displays changes in average real weekly earnings occurring between the time
of a job loss and the survey date for respondents to the 1996 DWS. The first column
shows results for the subsample who are working at the survey date; the second presents
averages for the full sample, using a zero value for weekly wages for those not employed in
February 1996. Real weekly wages of reemployed sample members increase by an average
of 9 percent between the displacement and interview dates, with still lazger gains for
persons avoiding joblessness, males, young workers, and those with little seniority on the
lost job.
These relatively favorable results may partially reflect the robust economic conditions
in the United States during the time period analyzed.~ However, these findings are not
inconsistent with the large earnings losses mentioned above for at least three reasons.
~During the 1993-1995 period, the civilian unemployment rate averaged 6.2 percent, 62.4 percent of
the civilian population were employed and real GDP grew 2.6 percent per year. The comparable figures
for the 1990-1992 time span were 6.6, 62.0, and 1.0 percent. Herz (1990) and Farber (1997), among
othets, show that workers adjust more easily to displacements occurring during booming periods than
when economic conditions are leas favorable. In addition, many of the earlier analyses have been restricted
to groups (e.g. petsons with more than three years tenure) likely to experience relatively large losses.
23First, persons who are not working at the survey date (and so are excluded from these
calculations) may have relatively low earnings potential. Second, the `before' vs. `after'
comparison does not account for changes that would have occurred in the absence of
the job loss (e.g. young workers have steep age-wage profiles, suggesting that losses could
result from foregone growth in wages). Third, pay frequently begins to decline prior to the
actual displacement (Hamermesh, 1991; Ruhm, 1991b; Jacobson et al., 1993), implying
that the earnings reduction is understated by these estimates. In addition, the median
displaced worker also does considerably worse than the mean individual -median weekly
wages decline by 4 percent conditional on reemployment and 29 percent for all job losers
-demonstrating the importance of considering the vaziance of wage outcomes.
The distribution of earnings changes is displayed in Table 18. As above, the conditional
estimates restrict the sample to reemployed workers, whereas the unconditional results
assume zero wages for those not working in February of 1996. The last two columns restrict
the sample to 25-49 year old men, to focus on a group with particularly strong labor
force attachments. The table highlights the substantial dispersion of postdisplacement
outcomes. Almost one-third of reemployed workers earn at least 10 percent more than
before being displaced, and the pay of 22 percent increases by at least one-quarter. Even
when nonworkers are included, 22 (15) percent receive a wage premium exceeding 10 (25)
percent in the new job. Conversely, weekly earnings fall at least 25 percent for 52 percent
of displaced workers and for 29 percent of those working at the survey date. Interestingly,
almost identical results are obtained for 25-49 year old males, with the one exception that
their higher rates of reemployment imply somewhat lower unconditional probabilities of
large wage losses.
Table 19 summarizes the results of a series of earnings regressions. The dependent
variable in the first two rows is the natural log of weekly wages in February 1996. The
second column includes predisplacement wages as a regressor, whereas the first does not.
The outcome in column (c) is the change in weekly (log) earnings. Effectively, this speci-
fication constrains the coefficient on previous wages to one, whereas column (b) allows it
to vary freely.~
Wage leveLs and changes could be affected by different factors. Postdisplacement earn-
ings will primarily reflect the general human capital possessed by the individual, whereas
reductions in pay occur due to losses of firm-specific human capital, job or industry rents,
or idiosyncratic residuals (luck). For instance, survey date earnings are positively related
with predisplacement tenure but wage reductions also increase with previous seniority,
suggesting that the preseparation tenure differential reflects a combination of specific and
general human capital.~ By contrast, education is positively correlated with earnings
ssNo effort is made to control for selection into employment. Therefore these results should be inter-
preted as providing information on the deterrninants of wages (or eamings changes) conditional on survey
date employment.
ssKletzer (1989), Addison and Portugal (1989), and Ruhm (1990), among others, provide earlier related
analysis.
24on both jobs, suggesting that it provides general human capita1.57 Males and married
individuals also earn more on both jobs. Conversely, persons 55 and over e~cperience
very large wage reductions. Nonwhites aze paid poorly in all periods but do not suffer
disproportionately from job loss; nor is there much evidence of an advance notice effect.
Somewhat surprisingly, those displaced due to slack work gain relative to those losing jobs
because of position or shift abolished.58 Finally, the coefficient on the predisplacement
wage, in column (b), suggests that slightly over half of any earnings residual received on
the old job is transferred to the new position.
6.2 The Netherlands
To analyze possible earnings losses between pre- and post-displacement jobs with the
LFS data, three transitions are relevant: E-N-E, E-U-E and E-E transitions. In our
sample, we have 1, 719 observations on these transitions, including both displacement
and other types of sepazation from the first employment spell. Only one income level
is reported for each individual labor market spell. However, under the assumption that
eaznings do not vary within employment spells, the change in eaznings between pre- and
post-separation jobs equals the change of earnings between the date of separation and the
date of entering the first new job. To correct these earnings differentials for inflation, we
have used the monthly all-item Consumer Price Index.59 After this inflation correction,
there aze 1, 551 observations left.so If we restrict our sample to workers with tenure of at
least one yeaz in the first employment spell, we have 668 observations.sl
The average post- and pre-separation eatnings ratio in this sample is 1.24, with a
standard error (of the mean) equal to 0.02. For the subsample of displaced individuals
(232 observations) this average equals 1.18, with a standazd error equal to 0.04. For our
subsample of workers with sufficient tenure we find an average eaznings ratio of 1.24 (0.02)
for all workers, and of 1.14 (0.03) for displaced workers (116 observations). In either case,
real earnings rise significantly between two consecutive employment spells. Because there
57Other research also suggeata the usefulneas of distinguishing betwcen general and apecific human
capital. For example, larger loasea have been found for displaced workers who switch induatries than for
those who do not; see Kletzer (1998) for a detailed aummary of this Gterature.
~Gibbons and Katz (1991) indicate smaller displacement-induced losaes for thoae affected by plant clos-
inga, than for other job losera but, as mentioned, do notdistinguish between alack work and paeition~shift
abolished.
59Source: CBS (1988,1991).
~There are several reasons for this loss of obaervations. First, the starting date of the fust obaerved
labor market state can be missing. In this cave the different states camiot be linked to calendar time,
which is needed for the inflation correction. Second, the sta.rting date may be inconsistent with the
reported sojourn time, given the date of the Srat interview. Finally, one or more sojourn times may be
missing.
a1Note that most observations are loat becauae tenure is missing: tenure is observed [or 1,069 of the
1,551 observations. Of theae 1,069 cases, 168 cases concern displacement. Of the 668 observationa with
sufficient tenure, 116 concern diaplacement, which is 69 percent of 168. This number is referred to in the
discussion of the UI inflow measure in Subaection 4.2.
25is no significant difference between the ratio for all workers and for displaced workers
(their 95 percent confidence intervals aze overlapping), this indicates that displacement
has no significant effect on future earnings. To investigate this further, we have have
regressed the log real eaznings ratio on tenure in the first employment spell, the duration
of the intervening non-employment spell, defined to be 0 for E-E cases, a dummy variable
indicating whether the separation concerns displacement, and some additional controls.
The estimation results aze reported in Table 20.
The estimation results confirm the preliminary conclusions from the comparison of the
averages. Displacement does not have a significant effect on earnings after a separation.
Moreover, the first column shows that the effect of displacement is very small if we do
not include the tenure criterion in the displacement definition. In column 2 we find some
evidence of a negative effect of displacement if we restrict the displacement indicator to
separations of workers with at least 1 yeaz of tenure. This is confirmed by estimates for
the tenure-restricted sample in the third column. Also, in all cases we find a significantly
negative effect of the length of the spell of intervening joblessness. Thus, workers who
have been without work longer experience smaller earnings gains. This can be explained
by stigma effects or loss of skills. Log tenure is generally insignificant, but the results
in the second column indicate that workers with tenure below 1 year face significantly
smaller earnings gains.
7 Retirement and disability
7.1 United States
As discussed, older persons obtain new jobs more slowly following displacements, than
younger individuals, and suffer relatively larger wage reductions when they do. One ex-
planation is that mature adults may actually fare worse than those who are younger.
Alternatively, the effects of aging and displacement may be confounded. This possibility
is particularly important given that labor force participation rates fall rapidly once indi-
viduals reach their late fifties; however, previous research provides little insight into the
relationship between loss and retirement.ó2
Table 21 supplies information on labor force participation and retirement~disability
status ofpreviously displaced workers, as of Februazy 1996. The missing category is `other'
reasons for being out of the labor force. Retirement and disability status are combined
because these are likely to be close substitutes for at least some older workers. The
62The labor force participation rates of 45-54 and 55-fi4 year old men (women) were 89 and 67 (75 and
50) percent respectively in 1996 (US Bureau of the Census, 1997). By contrast, 35-44 year olds were only
marginally more Gkely than those aged 45-54 to participate (92 percent ofinen and 78 percent of women).
The lack of research on displacement and retirement is ptobably due to the difficulty in using the DWS
for this type of analysis. The small earlier literature (e.g. Parnes, Gagen, and King, 1981; Anderson,
Burkhauser, and Quinn, 1986) that is relevant to this issue uncovers little evidence that displacements
have strong effects on retirement ages.
26table shows that retirement~disability probabilities rise and labor force participation rates
decline with age. However, as discussed, this may represent the normal process of aging,
rather than any unique consequence of job loss. To examine this possibility, Table 22
compares the labor force status of displaced and nondisplaced males. Displacement again
includes job loss in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to plant closing, slack work, or position~shift
abolished. Men are focused on because women are much more likely to report being
out-of-the labor force for ambiguous `other' reasons. Data are from the February 1996
Current Population Survey and Displaced Worker Supplement.
The table shows that male job losers are less likely than their nondisplaced peers to
participate in the labor force or to report being retired~disabled. Taken at face value, this
suggests that permanent layoffs delay rather than promote retirement. For example, this
could be the result of reduced wages (and a dominant income effect) or of other fmancial
losses (e.g. reductions in housing equity) that follow displacements. However, there is
an important qualification to this interpretation. The pazticipation and retirement rates
of nondisplaced individuals do not condition on labor force status in previous years. By
contrast, one must be working to be at tisk of displacement. Therefore, the ptobabilities
for displaced men in Table 22 are conditional on recent labor force participation, whereas
those for nondisplaced males are not. This distinction becomes increasingly important
with age. For example, 62 percent of 62-84 year old male job losers participate in the
labor force in February 1996, compazed to 46 percent of inen not terminated. But many
of the latter group are likely to have exited the labor force several years earlier, implying
that the conditional participation probabilities are much higher.
The following procedure was used to provide more compazable estimates of survey date
labor force status. First, age-specific probabilities of being in each state were calculated.~
Second, lagged labor force participation was estimated as the participation rate ofworkers
two years younger than the specified age. A two-year lag was chosen to roughly correspond
to the average amount of time since job loss for displaced workers. Third, conditional
labor force participation rates for nondisplaced men were calculated as the difference
between current and lagged labor force participation divided by the lagged rate. Similarly,
conditional retirement~disability ratea were estimated as the difference between current
and lagged values of retirement~disability probabilities, divided by lagged participation
rates.~
Figures 2 and 3 displaythe age-specific labor force participation and retirement~disability
probabilities for displaced and nondisplaced men. The unconditional estirnates for nondis-
~Tb reduce fluctuations due to small sample sizes (particularly for displaced workers) the probabil-
ities are actually calculated as three-year averagea centered around the epecific age (e.g. the retire-
ment~disability rate for `60 year olds'is actually the average retirement~disability rate of 59 to 61 year
olds.)
~These conditional probabilities are analogous but not identical to hazard rates. They differ in part
because: 1) some men who are initially nonparticipants might reenter the labor force during the compar-
ison period; 2) `lagged' status ia calculated for slightly younger workera in 1996, rather than for the same
cohort of inen in an earlier year; 3) there can be some movement over time between `other' reasons for
nonparticipation and retirement~disability.
27placed males correspond to those in Table 22; the conditional estimates are obtained using
the procedure described above. As mentioned, nondisplaced men have uniformly higher
probabilities of participating in the labor force and lower rates of retirement~disability.
However, conditional on being in the labor force two years eazlier, men in their middle
fifties and older who have not lost jobs are more likely to pazticipate and less likely to
classify themselves as retired or disabled than those who have. For example, the condi-
tional retirement~disability probabilities of 55, 60, and 64 year old nondisplaced males are
2, 8, and 27 percent, compared to 9, 16, and 38 percent for displaced men:~ Thus, these
results suggest that job loss may hasten retirement. Further analysis is needed before this
conclusion can be asserted with confidence.
7.2 The Netherlands
The results from Subsection 5.2 suggest that early retirement and DI have been used to
facilitate displacement in the Netherlands. The LFS data (Tables 11 and 12) show that at
least some displaced workers have persistently retired from the labor force, either by early
retirement or in DI, in the 1985-1990 period. The tables also indicate that this concerns
at most 10 percent of all displaced workers. More surprisingly, the FE data (Table 13)
attribute some role to both early retirement and DI in the 1993-1996 period, even though
DI legislation has undergone major changes to avoid improper use (see Section 2.2).
The improper use of DI and the role ofearly retirement have received ample attention
in the Dutch policy debate, and numerous empirical studies on these issues exist. Although
these usually do not focus on displaced workers per se, some of these papers offer insights
that are useful in the context of displacement.
A series of papers has sought to explain the relatively high DI caseload in the Nether-
lands (see Hassink, Van Ours, and Ridder, 1997, for an overview). It is found that up to
50 percent of the DI inflow before the reforms in the late 1980s is related to `redundancy
of workers', and not to actual health problems. This may appear as a rather extreme
conclusion, but it is consistent with the relatively high DI rates in the Netherlands (see
Section 2). Hassink et al., using a panel survey of firms by the OSA, estimate that still
10 percent of the DI inflow in the late 1980s (after the 1980s reforms) is related to redun-
dancy. Although they do not investigate DI in the course of the 1990s, it can be expected
that the 1993 reforms have reduced this number much further.
Thio (1997) uses a 1993 survey among elderly head of households and their partners,
conducted by the Centre for Economic Research on Retirement and Ageing (CEItItA).
Thio uses a subsample of heads of household of 53~3 years old who were not working
(`retired') at the time of the interview, have at least been working up to age 40, and
who have been working for at least 3 months with their last employer. The data distin-
guish various self-reported reasons for retiring from their last job. One group of reasons
corresponds to layoffs for economic reasons, or displacement. Other categories distin-
guished are quits, health-related separations, separations related to working conditions,
~The unconditional retirement~disability probabilities for nondisplaced men are 15, 29, and 58 percent.
28and sepazations because of family reasons. The data also distinguish vazious exit routes
for retirement, among which are early retirement and DI. In the sample of retired heads
of household used, 37 percent are on DI and 43 percent in eazly retirement. The average
retirement age is 54 years.
In 96 percent of the DI cases, health is reported as a reason for retirement, and in
86 percent as the primazy reason. In 24 percent of the DI cases, layoff is reported as
a reason, but in only 8 percent as the primary reason. This seems consistent with the
results found by Hassink et ad., as the average time between retirement and the survey is
5 years, implying that the results are roughly applicable to the late 1980s. F~rthermore,
as the data apply to the period before the major DI reform of 1993, the results are again
likely to overestimate the current role of DI in facilitating displacement. Of individuaLs
in early retirement, 37 percent report layoff as a reason for retirement, and 26 percent
report layoff as the primary reason. Thus, it seems that a significant share of the inflow
into eazly retirement is related to displacement. Finally, it is shown that 60 percent of
retirement because of layoffs, including retired in UI and other schemes, is concentrated
among 54-59 years old, and only 9 percent concerns individuals of age 60 and up. ~
8 Concluding remarks
This chapter analyzes the incidence and consequences of displacement in the US and the
Netherlands.
For the US, we provide an illustrative investigation using data from the February
1996 Current Population Survey and attached Displaced Worker Supplement. For the
Netherlands, no equivalent to the Displaced Worker Supplements exists, and displacement
is studied using three longitudinal data sets: an administrative firm-worker data set,
an administrative UI data set, and a labor force panel survey. The scope for direct
comparisons between the US and the Netherlands is limited by differences in the available
data. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that displacement is a common event in both
countries, that frequently results in some period ofjoblessness. Over the 1993-1995 period,
displacement rates are about the same in the US and the Netherlands, and vary similarly
with tenure and gender. Employment terminations also appear to hasten retirements
(or transitions into disability status) in both the US and the Netherlands, and there is
reason to believe that the consequences of displacement were less severe in the booming
US labor market of the mid-1990s than in earlier years. By contrast, in the Netherlands
displacement seems to be a more frequent phenomenon in the 1990s than in the 1970s
and 1980s.
In the Netherlands, non-employment durations aze usually much longer, conditional
upon a positive spell, but we have aLso provided some evidence that a much larger share
of displaced workers move into alternative employment d'uectly.s~
~By construction of the data set, the remainder is in the 4O-53 age group.
s~Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) provide a steady state estimate of unemployment durations of
29Because of these differences it is difficult to compare the wage discounts that follow job
loss in the two countries.~ For those displaced workers in the Netherlands that experience
positive non-employment spells, re-employment durations are sufficiently long to expect
sorting and stigma effects and loss of skills to significantly affect their labor market posi-
tion. As a result, the difference between pre- and post-displacement wages is more likely
to be affected by factors that are not due to displacement per se (see also Andersen, 1997).
This hampers the interpretation of empirical results on this wage difference.ó9 Also, if it is
difficult to leave unemployment then employed workers have a relatively strong incentive
to avoid unemployment. Workers in the Netherlands who expect displacement therefore
have a strong incentive to search actively for another job while still employed. Some job-
to-job transitions may therefore be the result of (anticipated) displacement. Indeed, if
unemployment durations aze long then employment may be a more important destination
state following displacement.70 Again, this suggests that issues like sorting are important,
and that workers moving directly into other jobs in the Netherlands may be quite different
from their US counterparts.
This not withstanding, it is noteworthy that wages were typically higher after the
displacement than before it, in both countries, for workers who had obtained new jobs.
This suggests that the losses in average earnings of reemployed workers should take the
form of slower wage growth than for persons avoiding displacement, rather than outright
reductions in compensation. This is actually confirmed by the Dutch data, which allow
for a compazison of eaznings changes of displaced and otherwise separated workers. How-
ever, the large variance of outcomes indicates that job loss may also place individuals at
considerable financial risk.
around 3 months for 1988 for both countries (see Layard et al., 1991: Table 1 of Chapter 5. Flirthermore,
Table 2 shows that this is fairly typical of the period 1962-1989). In the Netherlands, however, mean
unemployment durations are usually longer than one year: Layard et al. even give asteady atate estimate
of 25 months for 1988. Also, median re~mployment durations in our 1992 UI data set are 6 weeks longer
than median re-employment durations in the US data set.a This is remarkable, as our data set excludes
workers entering other schemes and hardly ever returning to employment, and includes at least some
short tenure workers, who can be expected to be more mobile. The finding that residual re-employment
durations increase dramatically with duration is consistent with this.
~These problems have recently been encountered by Cohen, Lefranc and SaintrPaul (1997), who com-
pare the US and FY~ench labor markets. Using the Enquéte Emploi, collected by the INSEE, for FYance
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the US, they find that wage discounts after displacement
are roughly similar in both countries. However, the discussion following the paper shows that it is not
easy to draw any clear conclusions from this.
69An additional empirical problem is that the post-displacement wage will frequently be unobserved
for these workers due to right-censored unemployment spells.
~oOf course, wotkers in the United States also have (weaker) incentives to awid unemployment and so
find new jobs prior to job loss.
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34Appendices
A The FE Data
The Firm Employment (FE) data were collected by the Dutch `Labor inspection', which
is part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and contains administrative
data on workers employed in both the private and the public sector. For our analyses we
only use private sector workers below 60 years of age with at least 1 year of tenure (unless
stated otherwise).
The data are collected yearly (in October 1993-1996) as repeated cross sections from
administrative wage records of a sample of firms by means of a stratified 2 steps sampling
procedure. In October of each year, in the first step a sample of firms is drawn. In
the second step, workers aze sampled from administrative records of these firms of two
moments in time, one year before the sampling date and at the sampling date. As the
two step sampling procedure is repeated in October 1993, October 1994, October 1995,
and October 1996, we have information on separations and displacement between October
1992 and October 1993, October 1993 and October 1994, October 1994 and October 1995,
and October 1995 and October 1996. For notational convenience, we will label these four
data periods by 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively. It should be noted that workers
that enter and leave a firm between the two sampling moments aze never sampled by this
method.
As both the first step firm sample and the second step worker sample are stratified,
we have to reweigh the data before performing any (cross-)tabulation. Firm strata are
distinguished by firm size (number of employees) and sector. The number of workers
sampled per firm depends on firm siae, whether the worker is a new entrant, a stayer
or has left in the previous period, and whether the employee is covered by a collective
agreement. Weights for the firm strata are computed from the `Business Statistics' of
CBS. For the determination of the weights of the employees, the CBS statistic `Jobs of
Employees' is used.
Table A1 provides some sample characteristics. It is useful to mention that the data
hardly contain any missing cases. Job complexity levels, for example, are known for more
than 99 percent of the workers. Below we give information on the construction of some
of the key variables.
~ displacement:
All workers with at least 1 year of tenure who are laid off, and, additionally, all
separations because of disability (DI), early retirement and transitions into other
jobs directly at firms that face a(net) loss of more than 30oI'o of theit work force.
. other outflow: Workers who separate from a(non-30Plo-shrinking) firm because of
(early) retirement, disability (DI), end of test-period, transition into an other job,
or expiration of a contract with a temporary work office.
35. job complexity level:
We use the following classification ofjob complexity levels:
- low: Simple, generally repeating, activities that take place under direct super-
vision. Little or no formal schooling or experience is required.
- intermediate: Less simple activities that partly take place without direct su-
pervision. Administrative or technical knowledge is often required.
- high: Activities that require a higher level of knowledge and experience, and
that take place without direct supervision. Also, management activities that
require an academic or comparable level.
. tenure:
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling dates).
. wage:
Monthly wages (including extra time payments, profit shares, etc.) and hours
worked are measured very accurately. We calculate gross hourly wages for each
worker and deflate the wage by the all-item Consumer Price Index.
. wage agreement:
We distinguish 3 types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective agreement
(CAO) which is negotiated at the sectoral level, or by leading firms within a sector.
The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the right to force all other firms
within a sector to follow an existing CAO, which is labeled by AW. The remaining
workers have bilateral employment contracts only. These workers are in general
employed at higher positions.
. pazt-time~full-time:
Part-time refers to working less than 100~10 of the regular number of hours.
. education:
Education refers to years of completed education. When it takes 4 years to complete
higher vocational education, the reported years of schooling will be 4 years (plus
the number of years it takes to finish high school and elementary school) even if the
worker has spent more or less years to complete his actual higher vocational degree.
B The UI data
The UI data set is provided by Dutch Social Security Council (SVr) and contains adminis-
trative data from the sectoral organizations that implement the unemployment insurance
system. All cases of individuals applying for unemployment benefits in 1992 were included
in the database, and, if necessary, followed up to September 1993. We create an initial
data set by restricting the raw data to cases that can be linked to a local labor mazket, i.e.
36individuals stazting collecting benefits in 1992 for which sector, municipality, and month
of inflow aze known.~l This data set contains 219,531 cases, and is used for computing
characteristics of local labor mazkets. Excluding all cases for which one or more regressor
variables are missing leaves 209,478 cases. This data set is merged with local labor market
characteristics computed from the initial data set, and will be the point of departure for
the re-employment duration analysis in Subsection 5.2. Below we give some details on
measurement and construction of some of the variables.
. duration unemployment insurance benefits:
Both the duration of the insurance benefits period and the destination state of
individuals whose benefits expire are observed. Durations are observed in intervals.
13 biweekly intervals cover the first half year. Then we have one 6-week interval,
for durations between 26 and 32 weeks. On the interva132 to 318 weeks we are able
to distinguish 22 quarterly duration classes. The remaining durations are observed
as being 318 weeks or longer. As we aze not considering benefit payments that
started before 1992, and we aze only following benefits recipients up to September
1993, there is no right-censoring because of observations in the residual class 318
weeks and higher. We observe, however, unemployment spells that are still lasting
at the end of September 1993, and destinations of transitions out of unemployment
insurance different from employment. In our analysis, both are considered to be
right-censored.
. sanctions:
The data set contains a variable indicating whether a sanction has been imposed at
the start of the UI spell (because of responsibility for becoming unemployed). We
do not use information on sanctions that are imposed during the UI spell, as these
are related to behavior during the unemployment spell and not to any behavior that
may have led to displacement.
. age:
Age is computed as the age in years at the start of the individual's benefits spell.
~ wage:
Wage is the daily wage before taxes earned by the individual before becoming un-
employed. It is the wage that is used by the administrative organization to compute
the level of the benefits. It is observed in 43 intervals of width 10 guilders up to 430
guilders, and a residual interval for those earning over 430 guilders. The continuous
wage variable is defined as the average wage in each wage class, or 435 guilders for
those in the highest wage class. An additional dummy is included for the highest
wage class.
. provinces and urbanization:
Municipality codes are observed and recoded to provincial and urbanization dum-
71See Subsection 5.2. We exclude individuals that are living abroad.
37mies. The provinces are Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland,
Gelderland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, and
Zeeland. Urbanized areas are municipalities that are highly urbanized according to
Statistics Netherlands (CBS): Amsterdam, Delft, The Hague, Groningen, Haarlem,
Leiden, Rijswijk, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Utrecht, Vlaardingen, and Voorburg.
~ part-time~full-time:
Like the wage information this variable refers to the employment situation of the
benefits recipient preceding the unemployment spell. hLll-time refers to working
100Q1o or more of the regular number of hours. Part-time refers to working less than
100P1o of the regular number of hours.
C The LFS data
The OSA (Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research) Labor Force
Survey follows a random sample of households in The Netherlands over time. On the
basis of these data, sequences of labor market states occupied by the respondents aze
reconstructed. Table A3 provides some characteristics of the sample that is used in this
chapter. The following labor mazket states are distinguished: employed, self-employed,
unemployed, not-in-labor-force, military service and full-time education. For each transi-
tion between two of these labor mazket states, the respondent is asked to provide a motive
or cause selected from an extensive list of possible motives and causes:
Due to `Tweeverdienerswet' (Law on double-income households)
I wanted a more interesting job
I wanted a more secure job
I wanted a job with better career opportunities
I wanted a better paying job
I would have lost my job anyway
Unemployment benefits are suflïcient




Laid off for other reasons
Early retirement
Retired, gone living off my investments
Disability
Marriage
Birth of a child
Move of household or partner
38(19). My family situation did not allow it anymore
(20). I wanted my old job back
(21). I wanted to earn my own wage or an extra wage again
(22). My family situation allowed it again
(23). I wanted to be more among people
(24). I wanted to attend classes again
(25). I just finished my education
(26). I had to fulfill military service
(27). I just fulfilled military service
Most respondents, 78 percent, do not experience a labor market transition. Almost
all respondents make less than 4 transitions (99 percent). The low number of transitions
can be explained by the relatively short observation period (at most 5 years) and the fact
that most respondents are breadwinners, who can be expected to have low job mobility.
At the date of the first interview, 62 percent of the respondents is employed, whereas 27
percent is nonparticipant and 7 percent is unemployed.
More details on the LFS data can be found in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and
Van den Berg (1992).
39Tables and figures
Table 1: United States: `Lower-Bound' Fstimates of Annual Displacement Rates (in
percent)
Time Period All Workers Males Females
1981 - 1983 3.8 4.4 3.0
1983 - 1885 3.0 3.4 2.5
1985 - 1987 2.7 3.1 2.2
1987 - 1989 2.4 2.6 2.1
1989 - 1991 3.4 4.0 2.8
1991 - 1993 3.2 3.6 2.7
1993 - 1995 3.1 3.4 2.8
Note: The table refers to job loss among 20-64 year olds (at the survey date) due to plant closing, slack
work, or position~shift abolished. The estimates are obtained by dividing by three the estimates for
three-year displacement rates due to these sources calculated by Farber (1997).
40Table 2: United States: Estimated Annual Displacement Rates During 1993-1995 Period
(in percent)
Tenure (years) All Workers Males Females
All Displacements
All 4.4 4.7 4.1
~1 5.3 6.0 4.7
1-2 8.9 9.6 8.2
3-~ 4.3 5.0 3.7
5-9 3.2 3.6 2.8
?10 2.4 2.2 2.6
Displacements Resulting in Joblessness
All 3.8 4.0 3.5
~1 4.6 5.2 4.2
1-2 7.7 8.3 7.1
3--4 3.6 4.3 3.1
b-9 2.6 3.0 2.2
?10 1.9 1.7 2.2
Note: Estimates for overall and sex-specific amual displacement rates areobtained using the lower-bound
displacement rates in Table 1 and then inflating them under the assumption that the equal numbers of
workers were displacecl in 1994 and 1993 as in 1995. lènure-specific rates are calculated by multiplying
theoverall displacement rate by the ratio of the fractionofdisplaced worloera with the apecified amount of
tenure divided by the fraction of all workers with that amount of tenure. For exsmple, the displacement
rate for persons with 1-2 yeara of seniority is calculated as: .044x.268~.132 -.089. The top panel shows
reaults for all typea of permanent job loas. The bottom panel is reetricted to diaplacements resulting in
an initial spell of joblessness.
Table 3: Netherlands: Reported labor market states of workers at exttemely shrinking
Srms: 1993-1996 (in percentage of employment at all firms)
criterium o!o Rrms l~yoff new job early retir. DI displacement
employment -20 0l0 16.0 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.0 4.8
(net change) -30 0!0 9.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 3.8
-40 9'0 4.7 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.5
outflow -20 0!0 50.3 1.5 2.4 0.2 0.1 7.2
(grosa change) -30 0l0 32.4 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.1 5.9
-40 0l0 19.5 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.0 5.1
Note: Based on weighted FE data Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure
below 1 year have been excluded. Firm shares are computed among firms with workers in the selected
category. `Layoff', `new job', `early retir.' and `DI' give the contributions to the aanual displacement
rate of the varioua typea of separations from strongly shrinking fu~ms. `Displacement' indicatea total
displacement (`layoffs', excluding `layoffs during test periods', at all Srms, and, on top of that, tranaitions
into `new jobs', `early retirement' and `DI' at shrinking firms) ss a percentage of total employment.








G 1 5.8 6.3 5.2
1-2 8.1 9.2 6.7
3-4 4.7 5.2 4.0
5-9 3.0 3.0 2.9
~ 10 1.9 1.9 2.0
Note: Based on weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Displacement is identified
with `layoffs' (excluding `layoffs during test periods') at any firm, and, on top of that, transitions into
`new jobs', `early retirement' and `DI' at firms with net employment changes G-30010.
42Table 5: Netherlands: Displacement and other separation frequencies 1993-1996 (in per-
cent)
variable no tranaition displaced other outflow
~ 88.3 3.8 7.8
Y~r 1993 87.2 7.6 5.2
1994 89.8 2.9 7.4
1995 88.3 3.6 8.1
1996 88.1 1.7 10.2
gender female 87.0 3.6 9.4
~e 89.1 3.9 7.0
tenure (years) c 1 88.0 4.5 7.5
1-2 81.7 6.8 11.5
3-4 87.1 4.0 9.0
5-10 91.3 2.6 6.1
1 10 93.9 1.7 4.4
coll. agreement CAO 88.8 3.6 7.7
AW 85.8 5.2 9.0
none 87.3 4.3 8.4
job complexity level low 82.6 5.7 11.8
intermediate 89.5 3.4 7.1
high 91.3 3.3 5.4
education (yeara) G 10 87.4 4.3 8.4
lOc.~15 89.9 3.1 7.1
~ 15 89.6 3.3 7.1
~ (Y~) 18-19 72.3 10.7 17.0
~-~ 83.0 5.8 11.2
30-39 89.7 3.4 6.9
40-49 93.0 2.6 4.4
~~ 90.4 2.1 7.5
Note: Based on weighted FE data. Workera older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure
below 1 yeaz have been excluded (except in the row giving reaulte for these workers). Displacement is
identified with `layoffe' (excluding `layoffs during teat periode') at any firm, and, on top of that, tranaitiona
into `new jobs', `early ret'uement' and `DI' at firms with net employment changea G-30qo. `CAO' refera
to coverage by a collective agreement,'AW'to coverage by a mandatory extension ofsuch an agreement.
43Table 6: Netherlands: Logit estimate of probability of displacement
estimate (s.e.) estimate (s.e.)
intercept -11.21 (2.58) wage agreement
log age 8.15 (1.62) CAO -0.00 (0.05)
(log age)2 -1.13 (0.23) AW -0.05 (0.08)
female -0.36 (0.05) sector
log tenure -0.54 (0.05) manufacturing 0.20 (0.11)
(log tenure)Z 0.02 (0.02) construction 0.44 (0.11)
log wage -2.52 (0.31) trade -0.16 (0.11)
(log wage)2 0.20 (0.05) restauranta etc. 0.39 (0.14)
part-time -0.24 (0.05) transport, comm. -0.03 (0.13)
education (years) 0.00 (0.01) financial 0.16 (0.12)
job complexity health -0.12 (0.11)
low -0.72 (0.10) flrm size
intermediate -0.68 (0.08) 10-19 -0.26 (0.06)
occupation 20-49 -0.42 (0.06)
simple technical 0.09 (0.16) 50-99 -0.56 (0.07)
administrative 0.30 (0.15) 100-199 -0.49 (0.06)
management -0.06 (0.17) 200~99 -0.24 (0.06)
services 0.14 (0.16) ~ 500 0.48 (0.05)
commercial 0.20 (0.16) year - 1993 1.46 (0.06)
creative 0.19 (0.21) year - 1994 0.38 (0.06)
year - 1995 1.07 (0.06)
log C -32,842.81
~' 100,908
Note: Logit estimate with dependent states `displaced' and `not displaced' (reference state). Based on
weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years or with tenure below 1 year are excluded. Displacement
is identified with `layoffs' (excluding `layoffs during test periods') at any firm, and, on top of that,
transitions into `new jobs', `early retirement' and `DI' at firms with net employment changes G-30010.
Wages are real gross hourly wages (in Dutch guilders) including extra time payments, profit shares,
etcetera. Age and tenute are measured in years. `CAO' refers to coverage by a collective agreement,
`AW' to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement. Firm size is measured by the number
of employees. Reference states are `male', `full-time', `high job complexity', `IT', `no collective wage
agreement', `agriculture~mining', `firm with G 10 workers', and `yeaz - 1996'.
44Table 7: Netherlands: Simulated annual displacement probabilities (in percent)



































Note: Based on logit estimatea (see Zàble 6), evaluated at the mean characteriatica of the population over
the period 1993-1996. Displacement ia identified with `layoffa' (excluding `layoffa during teat periods')
at any firm, and, on top of that, tranaitiona into `new jobe', `early retirement' and `DI' at firma with net
employment changes G -30010. `CAO' refera to coverage by a collective agreement, `AW' to coverage by
a mandatory extension of auch an agreement.
45Table 8: United States: Duration of Postdisplacement Joblessness
All Displacements Displacementa Resulting
in Joblessness
9'o Reemployed Within: o!o Heemployed Within:
6 Months 1 Year 6 Months 1 Year
All Displaced Workers 69.2 78.1 63.6 74.0
Sex
Males 72.3 80.5 67.0 76.7
Females 65.2 74.9 59.1 70.6
Age (in years)
20-29 75.5 82.7 71.2 79.7
30-39 70.8 78.9 65.4 75.0
40-49 69.0 79.9 63.1 76.0
50-54 60.5 70.4 53.4 65.0
55-59 54.4 63.5 44.1 55.3
60~4 48.1 58.4 39.5 51.4
Job Tenure (in years)
Q 72.4 80.6 68.3 77.6
1-2 73.0 81.4 68.3 78.1
3-4 66.6 76.5 61.1 72.7
5-9 67.7 74.4 60.4 68.7
~ LO 64.2 76.0 55.8 70.4
Note: Data are from the February 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement and apply to workers who were
20~i4 years old at the survey date and were displaced from jobs in 1993 or 1994. The data are weighted
so as to be nationally representative. Persons with missing values for job tenure are not separately broken
out because there are only 19 observations with valid data for weeks ofjoblessness.
46Table 9: United States: Survey Labor Force 5tatus of Displaced Workers (in percent)
Employed Unemployed Out of Labor Force
All Diaplaced Workera 71.6 16.9 11.0
Sex
Ma1ea 74.8 19.2 7.0
Females 64.7 13.7 17.6
nBe (in years)
20-29 72.1 18.6 9.3
30-39 74.1 14.9 11.1
40-49 75.2 15.3 9.6
50~4 66.0 20.6 13.4
55-59 57.7 20.6 21.7
~-84 46.4 19.5 34.1
Job Tènure (in yeara)
~1 65.0 23.2 11.8
1-2 75.0 14.8 10.2
3-4 74.7 12.8 12.6
5-9 76.6 14.7 8.7
? 10 70.0 15.0 15.2
Note: The table shows the labor force status in February 1996 of 20~i4 year old persone diaplaced from
jobs during the 1993-1995 period. Data are from the 1996 DisplacedWorkerSupplement and are weighted
so as to be nationally representative.
47Table 10: United States: Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of Postdisplacement
Joblessness




Job Tenure (in years)
1 - 2 .113 (.073) -.074 (.059) -.020 (.053)
3 - 4 .166 (.085) -.151 (.070) -.062 (.063)
5 - 9 .175 (.087) -.191 (.073) -.094 (.065)
~ 10 .205 (.092) -.241 (.080) -.122 (.071)
Age (in years)
30-39 -.097 (.071) -.152 (.057) -.143 (.051)
4o-4s -.14s (.o7s) -.177 (.osz) -.181 (.o5s)
50-54 -.230 (.112) -.443 (.093) -.420 (.083)
55-59 -.125 (.123) -.637 (.114) -.534 (.099)
so~4 -.2ss (.1s3) -.sss (.1s2) -.sos (.141)
Education
High School Grad. .195 (.098) .193 (.077) .212 (.071)
Some College .262 (.099) .311 (.078) .321 (.071)
College Graduate .274 (.110) .367 (.088) .372 (.080)
Graduate School .411 (.13fi) .251 (.113) .327 (.100)
Married .124 (.056) .026 (.046) .056 (.041)
Male -.028 (.053) .246 (.044) .189 (.039)
Nonwhite -.231 (.086) -.341 (.068) -.336 (.062)
Native Born .273 (.101) -.003 (.072) .072 (.067)
Source of Job Loss
Plant closing .o7s (.os8) .osz (.os7) .os3 (.oso)
Slack Work .058 (.070) -.005 (.057) .014 (.051)
Written Notice (in months)
G 1 -.074 (.092) -.131 (.075) -.125 (.068)
1 - 2 -.024 (.092) -.146 (.075) -.130 (.068)
~ 2 .235 (.080) -.023 (.073) .064 (.063)
Note: Column (a) shows the results of a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to one (zero)
if the respondent obtains a new job within oneweek ofthe displacement. Column (b) indicates coefficients
for a Cox proportional hazard model where the dependent variable is weeks ofjoblessness and the sample
is restricted to persons out of work at least one week following displacement. Column (c) shows results
for a Cox proportional hazard model estimated over all displaced workers were the dependent variable ia
weeks ofjobleasness plus one-half week. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes persons
displaced from jobs in 1993, 1994, or 1995 who are between the ages of 20 and 64 in February 1996. Data
are from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement. Sample sizes are 3525 in columns (a) and (c) and 2959
in column (b). The reference groups for the sets of dummy variables are persons with less than 1 year on
the predisplacement job, 20-29 year olds, high scho~~dropouta, thoce losing jobs due to position or shift
abolished, and thase with no written advance notice.Table 11: Netherlands: Displacement by motivation and transition
all diaplaced worloere
motivatiott
1 2 3 4 5 all
transition E-E 30 162 1 37 230
E-U 6 47 0 15 68
E-N 7 14 3 5 29
all 43 223 4 52 5 327
workers with tenure ~ 1 year
motivation
1 2 3 4 5 all
tranaition E-E 19 76 1 17 113
E-U 1 21 0 10 32
E-N 2 11 1 3 17
all 22 108 2 27 3 162
Note: Basedon the LFS. E-E denoteejob-to-job traositions, E-U denotes employment-to-unemployment
transitions, and E-N denotes employment-to-not-in-labor-force transitions. ii.ows correspond to self-
reported combinations of motivation for and wluntarineas of traoaitions: 1-`would have lost job
anyway', 2-`reorganization or plant cloeure', 3-`inwluntary early retirement', 4-`DI', and 5-
`wluntary disability' (E-N only).
Table 12: Netherlands: Labor market state 1 year after displacement by transition
all displaced worlaere
labor market state
E S U N M F all
transition E-E 143 0 3 1 0 0 147
E-11 17 2 27 1 0 1 48
E-N 4 0 0 18 0 0 22
all 164 2 30 ZO 0 1 217
workets with tenure ~ 1 year
labor market state
E S U N M F all
tranaition E-E 75 0 1 1 0 0 77
E-U 6 1 17 0 0 1 25
E-N 2 0 0 12 0 0 14
all 83 1 18 13 0 1 116
Note: Based on the LFS. E-E denotesjob-to-job tranaitiona,E-U denotesemployment-to-unemployment
transitions, and E-N denot~es employment-to-not-in-the-labor-force traositions. FLrthermore, E-`em-
ployed', S-`self~mployed', U- `unemployed and searching', N- `nobin-labor-force', M- `military
aervice', and F - `full-time education'.
49Table 13: Netherlands: R.eported labor market states of separated workers by net em-
ployment change
firms with net employment changes G-30010
layoff new job early retirement DI









layoff new job early retirement DI








Note: Based on weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure
below 1 year have been excluded.
50Table 14: Netherlands: Median residual re-employment durations (weeks)
all workera







at 0 weeka at 28 weeks
~ (Ye~)
G ~ 14.0 77.4
30S-C40 23.2 91.3
40 S. G 50 27.2 (oo)
~ ~ (~) (~)
dail,y wage (guilders)
C ~ 22.0 93.2
80 ~. ~ 110 26.6 106.9
110~.~150 15.5 97.7












not married 15.4 92.0
Note: Based on the UI data. Durations are obeerved in intervals and may be right-censored. Medians
are computed using the actuarial method, i.e. assuming that censoring and re-employment durationa
are uniformly distributed within observationalintervals. `oo'is used to denote mediaas larger than the
longest completed apell observed, i.e. that are beyond the scope of the data set.
51Table 15: Netherlands: MPH estimates re-employment durations
non-displaced (sanction)
sanctions~cell member
predicted size cell (c)











































8 - 16 weeks -0.13 (0.04)
16 - 24 weeks -0.26 (0.05)
24 - 32 weeks -0.43 (0.06)
32 - 45 weeks -0.80 (0.07)
45 - 58 weeks -1.05 (0.10)




IM mixing dist. 6.95 (2)
Wald sectors 628.99 (16)
Wald months 108.54 (11)
Wald provinces 20.75 (11) v2
Note: Based on the UI data. Sector, month of inflow and province dummies are included. Cell refers
to municipality x month of inflow UI x sector - groups. The sanction rate in each cell is included as a
regreasor. ALso, the number of individuals in each cell is regressed on municipality, montó of inflow UI,
and sector dumrnies, which gives ptedicted cell counts c and residuals Ê. Age in 10 years; wage is daily
wage in referral period in 100 Dutch guilders. Wages are right censored at 430 guilders. All vatiables
are included in deviation from their sample means. R.eference interval for the piecewise constant baseline
hazard is 0- 8 weelcs. An Information Matrix (IM) test statistic for local parameter variation in (vl, vZ),
or, equivalently, (vl,vZ,pl,p2), and Wald tests for thejoint significance of the 3 groups of dummies are
included. All tests are asymptotically Xz distributed with the degtees of freedom given in parentheses.
52Table 16: Netherlands: Simulated re-employment probabilities



























not mamed 0.56 0.74
Note: Probabilities are computed using the model estimates of Table 15. The first row is oomputed at
the mean of the regteavors in the sample used for estimation, and the estimated mean of the unobserved
heterogeneity component. All other rows oon~epond to single deviations from this mean.
53Table 17: United States: Ratio of Average Survey Date and Predisplacement Weekly
Earnings
Conditional on Survey Unconditional
Date Employment
All Displaced Workers 1.09 .74























Note: The table shows average values of the ratio of survey date (February 1996) to predisplacement
weekly wages, both measured in February 1996 dollars, using the all-itema Consumer Price Index to
adjust for price changes. Data are from the 1996 Displaced Workers Supplement are weighted so as to
be nationally representative. The sample includes persons aged ZO~i4, at the survey date, who last jobs
in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to slack work, plant closing, or position~shift abolished.
54Table 18: United States: Distribution of the Ratio of Survey Date to Predisplacement
Wages
All Displaced Workera 25-49 Year Old Men
Wage Ratio Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional
G .75 .289 .515 .262 .461
.75 - .9 .131 .089 .130 .095
.9 - 1.1 .256 .175 .282 .206
1.1 - 1.25 .100 .068 .106 .077
1 1.25 .224 .153 .221 .161
Note: The table showa the diatribution of the ratio of aurvey date (February 1996) to prediaplacement
weekly wages. Prediaplacement earnings are in February 1996 dollars, uaing the all-itemaConsumer Price
Index to adjust for price changea. Data ere from the 1996 Diaplaced Workers Supplement are weighted
so as to be nationally representative. The sample includea peraons aged 20~i4, at the eurvey date, who
last jobs in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to alack work, plant cloeing, or position~ahift aboliahed.
55Table 19: United States: Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of Postdisplacement
Earnings and Earnings Changes
Poat Displacement Wages Change in Wages
R,egressor (a) (b) (c)
Job Tenure (in years)
1 - 2 .155 (.038) .069 (.035) -.010 (.039)
3 - 4 .205 (.044) .082 (.041) -.018 (.045)
s - s .224 (.o4s) .os4 (.oa3) -.os4 (.047)
? 10 .213 (.050) -,044 (.048) -.260 (.051)
Age (in years)
30-39 .190 (.037) .015 (.035) -.114 (.038)
40-49 .212 (.040) .015 (.038) -.138 (.041)
50-54 .125 (.059) -.031 (.055) -.147 (.060)
55-59 .059 (.071) -.127 (.066) -.243 (.073)
60~4 -.082 (.100) -.226 (.093) -.324 (.102)
Education
High School Grad. .206 (.050) .129 (.047) .067 (.051)
Some College .304 (.051) .152 (.048) .035 (.052)
College Graduate .542 (.056) .289 (.053) .072 (.057)
Graduate School .709 (.071) .336 (.067) .014 (.071)
Married .o7s (.029) .043 (.027) .020 (.030)
Male .421 (.028) .198 (.028) .017 (.029)
Nonwhite -.068 (.044) .002 (.041) .038 (.046)
Native Born .029 (.048) -.Oll (.044) -.050 (.049)
Source of Job Loss
Plant closing -.o3s (.o3s) -.oos (.033) .o2s (.o3s)
Slack Work .002 (.037) .056 (.034) .103 (.037)
Written Notice (in months)
~ 1 -.033 (.048) -.072 (.044) -.oss (.o4s)
1 - 2 .057 (.048) .025 (.046) .005 (.050)
~ z .os3 (.044) .olz (.041) -.040 (.o4s)
Year of Displacement
1994 -.032 (.035) -.020 (.033) .007 (.036)
1995 -.109 (.034) -.087 (.032) -.056 (.035)
Predisplacement Wage .547 (.021)
Note: See note on Table 10. The dependent variable in columns (a) and (b) is the natural log of weekly
wages at the survey date. The dependent variable in column (c) is the difference in (the natural loga of)
weekly wages at the survey date and prior to displacement, both in February 1996 dollars.
56Table 20: Netherlands: Changes in earnings after displacement
all workera tenure ~ 1 yr.
- estimate (s.e.) estimate (s.e.) eatimate (s.e.)
constant 0.160 (0.036) 0.197 (0.038) 0.199 (0.046)
log tenure 0.016 (0.009) -0.Oll (0.015) -0.025 (0.018)
(log tenure)z -0.004 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 0.009 (0.016)
log age -0.101 (0.053) -0.087 (0.053) 0.002 (0.062)
(log age)~ 0.272 (0.153) 0.281 (0.153) 0.190 (0.185)
spell -0.008 (0.003) -0.008 (0.003) -0.008 (0.004)
dá„y~ -0.003 (0.033)
dá:.yi -0.049 (0.040) -0.050 (0.038)
female -0.025 (0.024) -0.024 (0.024) -0.024 (0.030)
education
intermediate -0.002 (0.027) -0.004 (0.027) 0.013 (0.032)
higher -0.022 (0.035) -0.022 (0.035) -0.043 (0.041)
university -0.030 (0.056) -0.029 (0.055) -0.083 (0.068)
married~cohabitating -0.049 (0.029) -0.051 (0.029) -0.067 (0.035)
non-Dutch 0.078 (0.074) 0.069 (0.074) -0.012 (0.086)
tenure C 1 year -0.104 (0.040)
Ra 0.024 0.031 0,02g
1~ 1069 1069 668
~ displaced 168 116 116
Note: Based on the LFS. Data on all traositioas between jobs with or without intervening non-
employment spells (E-E, E-U-E and E-N-E) are included. Dependent variable is the change in log real
after-tax monthly earnings between the pre- and poet~eparation employment apell. `Tenure' ia tenure on
the pre-separation job in months, and is also used to select the cases in the right panel. 'Age' denotes the
age at the date of the first interview in years. `Spell' is the duration of the non-employment epell between
the pre- and poet~eparation jobs in months (0 for E-E casea). dá;,~ is a dumrqy indicating whether
the separation was caused by displacement, using the defínition discuseed in the main text. ddf,a equals
dd;,p~ with the additional requirement that the tenure of the displaced individual equals at least 1 year.
Reference states are `non-displaced', `male', `primary~lower education', `unmarried and not cohabitating',
`Dutch', and `tenure ? 1 year'. `log tenure', `log age', and `spell' are included in deviation from their
sample means. In `(log tenure)~' and `(log age)~', both `log tenure' and `log age' are in deviation from
their sample means, which correspond to geometric meaos of tenure and age equal to reapectively 18.0
months and 28.9 years in the full sample and 39.8 months and 29.9 years in the tenure-restricted sample.
57Table 21: United States: Survey Date Labor Force Status of Displaced Workers (in
percent)
All Displaced Males Females
Age (years) In Labor Retired~ In Labor Retired~ In Labor Retired~
Force Disabled Force Disabled Force Disabled
30-39 89.0 1.1 95.3 1.3 81.1 1.0
40-49 90.5 1.5 92.7 1.6 87.4 0.7
50-54 86.6 5.8 92.8 4.0 78.1 8.1
55-59 78.3 12.3 83.2 12.6 71.0 11.9
60-84 65.9 27.3 71.4 24.7 58.9 30.5
Note: The table shows the labor force status in February 1996 of persons displaced from jobs during the
1993-1995 period. Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement and are weighted so as to be
nationally representative.
Table 22: United States: Survey Date Labor Force Status of Displaced and Nondisplaced
Males (in percent)
Not Displaced Displaced
Age (years) In Labor R.etired~ In Labor Retired~
Fbrce Disabled Force Disabled
44-48 90.4 5.9 93.8 1.6
47-49 90.0 7.1 91.5 3.0
50-52 86.4 11.1 95.0 2.2
53-55 83.5 14.1 90.8 4.7
56-58 75.3 21.5 81.9 16.5
59~i1 68.0 29.3 79.7 16.7
62-84 46.0 52.1 61.8 34.9
Note: The table shows the labor force status in February 1996. `Displaced' individuals are those losing
joba during the 1993 through 1995 period due to plant closing, slack work, or position~shift abolished.
Data are from the February 1996 Current Population Survey and Displaced Worker Supplement and are
weighted so as to be nationally representative.
58Figure 1: Netherlands: The annual rate of displacement
Yeo, -~
Note: The displacement rate is defined as the ratio of the number of new UI cases and the number of
employed paying UI premiums. Sourc~: (enumerator) CTSV (1996), Table 6.1; (denominator) CBS
(1996); (GDP growth) OECD (1990,1995).
59Figure 2: United States: Labor Force Participation R.ates of Displaced and Nondisplaced
blales
ae 52 56 60 6a
Age -~
Figure 3: United States: Retirement~Disability Rates of Displaced and Nondisplaced
Males
- nontlisp~eced (unconditlono~)
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wll. agreement CAO 0.72
AW 0.05
none 0.23






real grces hourly wage (guildera) 27.1
total ~ workers 102,141
Note: Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workera with tenure below 1 year have been
excluded. `year' refera to sampling year. Note that data on two conaecutive yeara for each wrorker are
collected at a single sampling date, October ofthe sample year, by reviewing the adminiatrative records
ofboth the sampling date and one year before the aampling date. `CAO' refera to coverage by a collective
agreement, `AW' to coverage by a mandatory extenaion of auch an agreement.
61Table A2: Netherlands: Some characteristics UI data
mean at. dev.
~ spells 209,478 non-displaced (sanction) 0.13
terminated by age (yeazs) 32.0 10.9
re~mployment 0.56 daily wage (guilders) 122.5 65.9
maximum entitlement 0.12 female 0.43
transition into DI 0.07 urban 0.17
end of observation period 0.17 part-time 0.29
other 0.08 married 0.40
Note: Wages are observed in 10-guilder intervals and are right~ensored at 430 guilders. Sample mean
and standazd error of wages are computed by recoding wages to mean interval wages, or to 435 guilders
if right-censored. `Other' includes (among other things) reaching the age of 65 yeara, death, military
service and self-employment, all of which occur in leav than 0.5 percent of the cases.
Table A3: Netherlands: characteristics LFS earnings sample
all workers tenure 1 1 yr.
variable mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
ratio post- and pre-separation earnings 1.22 0.62 1.24 0.55
tenure (months) 44.4 71.0 67.5 81.5
age (years) 30.0 8.1 31.0 8.3
spell (months) 0.7 3.5 0.6 3.3
i.d., nonzero spells only 8.8 9.5 10.4 10.1









total ~ individuals 1069 668
~ nonzero intervening spells 81 37
Note: `Ratio post- and pre.separation earnings' refeis to real after-tax monthly earni~w in the pre-
separation and the first post-separation jobs. `Tenure' is tenure on the pre-separation job in months, and
is also used to select the cages in the right panel. 'Age' denotes the age at the date of the first interview
in years. `Spell' is the duration of the non-employment spell between the pre- and post-separation
jobs in months (0 for E-E cases). dd~,P~ is a dummy indicating whether the separation was caused by
displacement (1) or not (0), using the definition discussed in the main text. dá„oi equals dá;,p~ with the
additional requirement that the tenure of the displaced individual equals at least 1 year.
62No. Author(s) Title
9810 L. Bettendorfand F. Verboven Compctition on the Dutch Coffce Market
9811 E. Schaling, M. Hceberichts
and S. Eijffinger
9812 M. Slikker
9813 T. van de Klundert and
S. Smulders
9814 A.Belke and D. Gros
9815 1.P.C. Kleijnen and O. Pala
9816 C. Dustmann, N. Rajah and
A. van Scest
Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty:
Walsh-Svensson non-Equivalence Revisited
Average Convexity in Communication Situations
Capital Mobility and Catching Up in a Two-Country,
Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth
Evidence on the Costs of Intra-European Exchange Rate
Variability
Maximizing the Simulation Output: a Competition
School Quality, Exam Performance, and Career Choice
9817 H. Hamers, F. Klijn and ]. Suijs On the Balancedness ofm-Sequencing Games
9818 S.J. Koopman and J. Durbin Fast Filtering and Smoothing for Multivariate State Space
Models
9819 E. Droste, M. Kosfeld and Regret Equilibria in Games
M. Voomeveld
9820 M. Slikker A Note on Link Fortnation
9821 M. Koster, E. Molina, Core Representations ofthe Standard Fixed Tree Game
Y. Sprumont and S. Tijs
9822 J.P.C. Kleijnen Validation ofSimulation, With and Without Real Data
9823 M. Kosfeld Rumours and Markets
9824 F. Karaesmen, F. van der Duyn Dedication versus Flexibility in Field Service Operations
Schouten and L.N. van Wassen-
hove
9825 J. Suijs, A. De Waegenaere and Optimal Design of Pension Funds: A Mission Impossible
P. Borrn
9826 U.Gneery and W. Guth On Competing Rewards Standards -An Expcrimental SNdy of
Ultimatum Bargaining-
9827 M. Dufwenberg and U. Gneery Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental
Study
9828 A. Blume, D.V. De Jong and Leaming in Sender-Receiver Games
G.R. Neumann
9829 B.G.C. Dellaert, J.D. Brazell Variations in Consumer Choice Consistency: The Case of
and J.J. Louviere Attribute-Level Driven Shifts in ConsistencyNo. Author(s) Title
9830 B.G.C. Dellaert, A.W.J. Consumer Choice of Modularized Products: A Conjoint choice
Borgers, J.). Louviere Experiment Approach
and H.J.P. Timmermans
9831 E.G.A. Gaury, H. Pierreval New Species ofHybrid Pull Systems
and ].P.C. Kleijnen
9832 S.J. Koopman and H.N. Lai Modelling Bid-Ask Sprcads in Competitive Dealership Markets
9833 F. Klijn, M Slikker, S. Tijs Characteri7ations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex
and J. Zarzuelo Games
9834 C. Fershtman, N. Gandal and Estimating the Effect ofTax Reform in Differentiated Product
S. Markovich Oligopolistic Markets
9835 M. Zeelenberg, W.W. van Dijk, Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role
J. van der Pligt, A.S.R. of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience ofRegret and
Manstead, P. van Empelen Disappointment
and D. Reinderman
9836 M. Zeelenberg, W.W. van Dijk Reconsidering the Relation bcnveen Regret and Responsibility
and A.S.R. Manstead
9837 M. Dufivenberg and A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity
G. Kirchsteiger
9838 A. Xepapadeas and Environmental Policy and Competitiveness: The Porter Hypo-
A. de Zecuw thesis and the Composition of Capital
9839 M. Lubyova and ].C. van Ours Unemployment Durations of 1ob Losers in a Labor Market in
Transition
9840 P. Bolton and X. Freixas
9841 A. Rustichini
9842 J. Boone
9843 H.L.F. de Groot
9844 U. Gneezy, W. Guth and
F. Verboven
9845 A. Prat
9846 P. Borm and H. Hamers
A Dilution Cost Approach to Financial Intertnediation and
Securities Markets
Minimizing Regret The General Case
Competitive Pressure, Selection and Investments
Development and Fundantcntal Research
Macrceconomic Consequences of Outsourcing. An Analysis of
Grow~th, Welfare, and Product Variety
Presents or Investments? An Experimental Analysis
How Homogeneous Should a Team Be?
A Note on Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with
Due Dates
9847 A.J. Hoogstrate and T. Osang Saving, Openness, and Gro~~1hNo. Author(s)
9848 H. Degryse and A. Irmen
9849 J. Bouckaert and H. Degryse
9850 1.R. ter Horst, Th. E. Nijman
and F.A. de Roon
9851 1.R. ter Horst, Th. E. Nijman
and F.A. de Roon
9852 F. Klaassen
9853 F.].G.M. Klaassen and
1.R. Magnus
9854 J. de Haan, F. Amtenbrink
and S.C.W. Eijffinger
9855 1.R. ter Horst, Th.E. Nijman
and M. Verbeek
9856 G.1. van den Berg, B. van der
Klaauw and ].C. van Ours
9857 U. Gneery and A. Rustichini Pay Enough-Or pon't Pay at All
9858 C. Fershtman A Note on Multi-Issue T~vo-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral
Procedures
9859 M. Kaneko Evolution of l hoa.:ht. Deductive Game Theories in the
Inductive Ganm Situation Part I
Title
On the Incentives to Provide Fuel-Efficient Automobiles
Price Competition Benveen an Expert and a Non-Expert
Style Analysis and Performance Evaluation of Dutch Mutual
Funds
Perfomiance Analysis of Intemational Mutual Funds
Incorporating Market Frictions
Improving GARCH Volatility Forecasts
On the Independence and Identical Distribution ofPoints in
Tcnnis
Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantification
Eliminating Biases in Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance
from a Survivorship Free Sample
Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to
Work
9860 M. Kaneko Evolution of Thoughts: Deductive Game Theories in the
Inductive Gamc Situation. Part II




M. Voorneveld and A. van den
Nouweland
E.W. van Luijk and J.C. van
Ours
B.G.C. Dellaert and B.E. Kahn
9865 E.W. van Luijk and ].C. van
Ours
9866 G. van der Laan and R. van
den Brink
Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private
Criteria; An Investigation ofCore Concepts
On the Determinants ofOpium Consumption; An Empirical
Analysis ofHistorical Data
How Tolerable is Delay? Consumers' Evaluations of Intemet
Web Sites after Waiting
How Govemment Policy Affects the Consumption ofHard
Drugs: The Case ofOpium in Java, 1873-1907
A Banzhaf Share Funaion for Cooperative Games in Coalition
Structure
9867 G. Kirchsteiger, M. Niederle The Endogenous Evolution ofMarket Institutions AnNo. Author(s)
and J. Potters
9868 E. van Damme and S. Hurkens
9869 R. Pieters and L. Warlop









Visual Attention During Brand Choice: The Impact of Time
Pressure and Task Motivation
Short-Term Robustness of Production Management Systems
Bank Dept and Publicly Traded Dcbt in Repeated Oligopolies
L. Brcersma and J.C. van Ours ]ob Searchers, Job Matches and the Elasticity of Matching
M. Burda, W. Guth, Employmcnt Duration and Resistance to Wage Reductions:
G. Kirchsteiger and H. Uhlig Experimental Evidence
J. Fidrmuc and 1. Horváth
9875 P. Borm, D. Vermeulen
and M. Voomeveld
Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-up of
Czechoslovakia
Thc Structurc of[hc Sct of Equilibria for T~~o Pcrson Multi-
critcria Gamcs
9876 J. Timmer, P. Borm and J. Suijs Linear Transformation ofProducts: Games and Economies
9877 T. Lensberg and E. van der A Cross-Cultural Study of Reciprocity, Trust and Altruism
Heijden in a Gift Exchange Experiment
9878 S.R. Mohan and A.l.l. Talman Refinemcnt of Solutions to the Linear Complementarity
Problem
9879 J.J. Inman and M. Zeelenberg "Wow, I Could've Had a V8!": The Role of Regret in
Consumer Choice
9880 A. Konovalov Core Equivalence in Economies with Satiation
9881 R.M.W.J. Beetsma and The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union
A.L. Bovenberg
9882 A. de Jong and R. van Dijk Determinants ofLeverage and Agency Problems
9883 A. de long and C. Veld An Empirícal Analysis of Incrcmental Capital Structure
Decisions Under Managerial Entrenchment
9884 S. Schalk A Model Distinguishing Production and Consump[ion Bundles
9885 S. Eijffinger, E. Schaling and The Tenn Structure of Interest Rates and Inflation Forecast
W. Verhagen Targeting
9886 E. Droste and ]. Tuinstra Evolutionary Selection of Behavioral Rules in a Coumot
Modcl: A Local Bifurcation Analysis
9887 U. Glunk and C.P.M. Wilderom High Perfomiance on Multiple Domains: Operationalizing theNo. Author(s)
9888 B. van der Genugten
9889 A.S. Kalwij
9890 T. Leers, L. Meijdam and
H. Verbon ~
9891 R.T. Frambach, J. Prabhu
and T.M.M. Verhallen
9892 H. Houba and G. van Lomwel
9893 T.H.A. Bijmolt and R.G.M.
Pieters
9894 E. van Damme and
J.W. Weibull
Title
Stakeholder Approach to Evaluate Organi7ations
A Weakened Fortn of Fictituous Play in Two-Person Zero-Sum
Games
Household Wealth, Fcmale Labor Force Participation and
Fcrtility Decisions
Ageing and Pension Refonn in a Small Open Economy: the
Role ofSavings Incentives
The Influence ofBusiness Strategy on Market Orientation and
New Product Activity
Counter lntuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage
Negotiations
Generaliiations in Marketing Using Meta-Analysis with
Multiple Measurements
Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs
9895 A. Prat and A. Rustichini Sequential Common Agency
9896 J.H. Abbring, G.J. van den Berg Displaced Workers in the United States and the Netherlands
P.A. Gautier, A.G.C. van
Lomwel and J.C. van Ourse- -- II~ÍÍIIIÍÍÍIIáMÍMII 9u